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Abstract 
 
Is hedging with credit derivatives always beneficial? The 
benefit of hedging with credit derivatives, such as credit default 
swaps, is presumed by the Dodd-Frank Act, which excludes hedge 
transactions from much of the new financial regulation. Yet, 
significant new risks can arise when credit derivatives are used to 
manage risks. Hedging, therefore, should be defined not only in 
relation to whether a transaction offsets risks, but also whether, on 
balance, the risks that are mitigated—as well as any new risks that 
arise—are outweighed by the potential benefits.  
Firms using credit derivatives to hedge often fail to account 
for the full costs associated with using those instruments. There are 
numerous risks that can arise. Informational asymmetries and 
negative externalities, however, make it difficult for firms to 
accurately assess those risks. Consequently, the far-reaching 
exemptions for hedge activity provided by the Dodd-Frank Act are 
inappropriate. Credit derivative hedges must be subject to regulatory 
oversight, rather than exemption.  
Regulators of the derivatives markets must consider the risks 
of hedging with credit derivatives and the inability of firms to 
account for those risks, as well as the value to firms of mitigating 
risks with credit derivatives and the costs arising from their use. 
Among other proscriptions, the types of credit derivatives 
transactions that can be classified as a hedge should be limited, as 
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well as the size of those positions. In addition, margin and collateral 
requirements for credit derivatives should take account of the 
greater risks arising from their use.  
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Introduction 
 
As the European debt crisis worsens at the end of 2011, with 
no signs of improving, a large, multinational financial institution 
becomes concerned with its exposure to the European credit markets. 
To offset this risk, the firm’s risk strategists formulate a complex 
series of transactions using credit default swaps (“CDSs”)1 to 
minimize the firm’s risk exposure to the region. Based on historical 
information and expected market movements, the firm’s risk 
managers believe that the best way to minimize the firm’s exposure 
is by using CDSs to sell credit protection on an index of large U.S. 
companies. Under this strategy, the firm would earn a premium on 
the CDSs sold, which the risk managers believe would provide the 
company with a way to offset losses in the event that Europe’s debt 
crisis worsens. Because of the extent of its exposure to the European 
crisis, the firm aggressively sells credit protection, establishing a 
large position in the market. The firm’s position attracts the attention 
of market participants because its trading activities are distorting the 
market. 
Unfortunately, the strategy backfires. The size and 
complexity of the trades proves to be too much, creating risks that 
the firm’s risk managers did not anticipate. The index on which the 
firm sold protection did not behave as expected, drastically 
increasing the overall risk exposure of the firm and resulting in 
significant losses. The strategy, which should have provided the firm 
with a way to offset loss due to worsening European credit, instead 
causes the firm billions in losses.  
The firm in the foregoing example is not a hypothetical one; 
rather, it is the scenario that JP Morgan faced in the first and second 
quarters of 2012.2 A JP Morgan employee and member of the firm’s 
                                                          
1 A CDS is an insurance-like product that enables parties to manage credit 
risk by purchasing credit protection from a third party, which promises to 
reimburse the protection buyer in the event of default or non-payment by a 
creditor. Daniel Hemel, Comment, Empty Creditors and Debt Exchanges, 
27 YALE J. ON REG. 159, 161 (2010). CDSs and other credit derivatives are 
discussed in greater detail infra Part I. 
2 Katy Burne, Making Waves Against ‘Whale,’ WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2012, 
at C1; Jesse Eisinger, Volcker Rule Gets Murky Treatment, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 18, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/18 
interpretation-of-volcker-rule-that-muddies-the-intent-of-congress; Dan 
Fitzpatrick, Robin Sidel & David Enrich, Bank Order Led to Losing Trades: 
J.P. Morgan’s Efforts to Shield Itself from European Market Fallout 
2013-2014 HAZARDOUS HEDGING 817 
 
Chief Investment Office, dubbed “the London Whale,” engaged in a 
risk management strategy that cost the firm billions of dollars in 
losses.3 According to JP Morgan, the trades were supposed to “hedge 
the bank’s global structural risks and the [Chief Investment Office’s] 
investments are directly related to managing those risks.”4 The losses 
from the trades, however, forced the financial giant to restate its 
earnings for the first quarter5 and impacted its earnings for the 
second quarter.6 JP Morgan, in trying to manage its risk exposure, 
had, in actuality, increased it unexpectedly.  
In spite of the size of the losses and JP Morgan CEO Jamie 
Dimon’s mea culpa acknowledging the “poorly reviewed, poorly 
executed and poorly monitored” trades, JP Morgan executives held 
steadfast that the trades were done to “hedge” the firm’s credit 
exposure.7 Yet, the trades, in the opinion of some, were highly 
                                                                                                                           
Prompted Disastrous Bets, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2012, at A1; Gregory 
Zuckerman & Katy Burne, ‘London Whale’ Rattles Debt Market, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 6, 2012, at A1 (describing the impact of JP Morgan’s trading on the 
CDS index market, stating, “A sign of how hot the trade is: [t]he net 
‘notional’ volume in the index ballooned to $144.6 billion on March 30[, 
2012] from $92.6 billion at the start of [2012]”). 
3 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 2, at A1 (“[T]he trader . . . earned the ‘whale’ 
nickname by taking large positions that roiled a corner of the credit 
market.”). 
4 Burne, supra note 3, at C1 (quoting JP Morgan spokesman Joe Evan-
gelisti).  
5 Joe Weisenthal, JPMorgan to Restate Q1 Earnings After Discovering 
Material Weakness, BUS. INSIDER (July 13, 2012), http://www. 
businessinsider.com/jpmorgan-to-restate-q1-earnings-2012-7 (“The restate-
ment . . . will reduce the firm’s previously-reported net income for the 2012 
first quarter by $459 million. The restatement relates to valuations of certain 
positions in the synthetic credit portfolio in the firm’s Chief Investment 
Office . . . .”). 
6 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Says Trading Loss Tops $5.8 
Billion; Profit for Quarter Falls 9%, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2012, 10:10 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/jpmorgan-reports-second-
quarter-profit-of-5-billion-down-9/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (“JP 
Morgan Chase on Friday said that losses on its botched trade had reached 
$5.8 billion so far this year. Despite those losses, the bank reported a 
second-quarter profit of $5 billion, down 9%.”). 
7 Dan Fitzpatrick, Gregory Zuckerman & Liz Rappaport, J.P. Morgan’s $2 
Billion Blunder: Bank Admits Losses on Massive Trading Bet Gone Wrong; 
Dimon’s Mea Culpa, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2012, at A1 [hereinafter J.P. 
Morgan’s $2 Billion Blunder]. 
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reminiscent of speculative trades that were seen as being responsible 
for the 2008 financial crisis.8 Many also opined that JP Morgan’s 
activity was prohibited under the Volcker Rule,9 a controversial 
section10 of the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act” or “Act”).11 
Interestingly, Mr. Dimon asserted that the trading strategy “doesn’t 
violate the Volcker [R]ule . . . .”12—which prohibits speculative 
trading but permits banks to engage in “hedging” or “risk mitigating” 
trading.13 In stating that the billion-dollar loss inducing trades did not 
violate the Volcker Rule, Mr. Dimon affirmed the company’s stance 
that the trades were “hedges.” 
A hedge, in general terms, mitigates or offsets risk 
exposure.14 Yet, as JP Morgan executives asserted that the large 
losses were the result of a failed hedge strategy, many wondered: 
What exactly is a hedge?15 Moreover, if “hedges” like the ones 
involved in the London Whale fiasco could be so complex and 
                                                          
8 Zachary A. Goldfarb, JPMorgan Loss Deals Blow to Fight Against 
Regulations, WASH. POST, May 12, 2012, at A1 (“The bad trades that 
caused JP Morgan’s loss recalled the type of complex, highly speculative 
strategies that helped to nearly crater the banking industry in 2008—before 
taxpayers stepped in to bail it out. In this case, the trader in London tried to 
‘hedge,’ or protect against, corporate bonds and loans owned by JP 
Morgan.”).  
9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)) (the Volcker Rule).  
10 Andrew F. Tuch, Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and 
Goldman Sachs, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 365, 369 (2012) (“The most 
controversial [provision] is [s]ection 619, the so-called Volcker Rule . . . .”); 
see also Ian Katz & Kasia Klimasinska, Lew Says Volcker Rule to Prevent 
Repeat of London Whale Bets, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-05/lew-says-volcker-rule-meets-
obama-s-goals-in-financial-oversight.html. 
11 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
12 J.P. Morgan’s $2 Billion Blunder, supra note 7, at A2. 
13 See infra Part II, for a more detailed discussion on the Volcker Rule. 
14 “Hedge” is defined as: “To use two compensating or offsetting 
transactions to ensure a position of breaking even . . . .” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 791 (9th ed. 2009).  
15 See, e.g., Eisinger, supra note 2 (discussing the imprecision of the term 
“hedge” and arguing that federal regulators have provided little clarity as to 
the term’s precise meaning).  
2013-2014 HAZARDOUS HEDGING 819 
 
increase, rather than reduce, risks, should the newly enacted 
derivatives regulatory scheme under the Dodd-Frank Act exempt 
such transactions?  
The London Whale fiasco demonstrates that not all hedges 
are created equal; rather, given the complex hedging strategies 
available, such transactions may increase the risk exposure of a firm. 
The success of the new derivatives regulatory regime in reducing the 
risks associated with hedging with credit derivatives is impacted, in 
large part, by what types of transactions are identified as hedges and, 
therefore, exempted from regulatory oversight. This Article proposes 
that in deciding whether or not a transaction is a hedge, one should 
balance the risks of a transaction against its expected benefits.  
Derivatives, especially credit derivatives,16 have become 
essential tools for risk management.17 Given that risk, specifically 
credit risk, is an inevitable aspect of business operations, risk 
management is a major component of the operation of most firms—
financial and non-financial alike. 18  
Through credit derivatives, such as CDSs, firms can target, 
diffuse, and minimize their credit risk exposure.19 Credit derivatives 
                                                          
16 Michael S. Gibson, Credit Derivatives and Risk Management 1 (Fed. 
Reserve Bd., Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, Working 
Paper No. 47, 2007), available at http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/ 
2007/200747/200747pap.pdf (“The growth of credit derivatives suggests 
that market participants find them useful for risk management.”).  
17 See Bruce S. Darringer, Swaps, Banks, and Capital: An Analysis of Swap 
Risks and a Critical Assessment of the Basle Accord’s Treatment of Swaps, 
16 U. PA. J. INT’L. BUS. L. 259, 273 (1995) (“For certain swaps, the swap 
dealer may never find a perfect match, and therefore must use dynamic 
hedging to neutralize its risk exposure throughout the life of the swap.”); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 221–22 (2008) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Systemic Risk] (“These hedging strategies, at least 
theoretically, facilitate risk-spreading to parties better able to bear the 
risks . . . . This diversification of risk also reduces the likelihood that a 
default will cause any given institution to fail and mitigates the impact of 
any such failure on other institutions . . . .”). 
18 The extension of funds, goods, or services on credit exposes firms to the 
risk of non-payment—i.e., credit risk. See DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS, CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES & THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK 38 (2000). Credit risk is the 
risk of default or non-payment and has been described as one of the oldest 
risks in the markets. Id. (“Credit risk is the oldest form of exposure in 
financial markets.”). 
19 See Frank D’Souza, Nan S. Ellis & Lisa M. Fairchild, Illuminating the 
Need for Regulation in Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC 
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also allow the trading of specific and discrete aspects of risk, without 
selling or trading the underlying source of risk.20 Importantly, these 
instruments are malleable, granting firms much wanted flexibility in 
managing credit risk.21 
With credit derivatives, firms are able to transfer credit risk 
to those who are able and willing to bear the risks more efficiently or 
at a lower cost.22 This is the purpose of hedging.23 Ideally, a hedge 
diffuses one firm’s risks among numerous entities, thereby 
minimizing the negative externalities that arise from the 
concentration of risk.24 Because hedging typically has positive 
externalities beyond the entities involved, it is widely considered a 
beneficial activity that should be encouraged.25 The introduction and 
                                                                                                                           
Derivatives Market, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 473, 474 (2010) (“[Derivatives] 
can be used as a hedge against potential losses from unpredictable changes 
in commodity and financial markets. As such, if used properly, derivatives 
are a good way of transferring risk.”).  
20 See David Mengle, Credit Derivatives: An Overview, 92 FED. RES. BANK 
OF ATLANTA ECON. REV. 1, 1–2 (Fourth Quarter 2007), available at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/erq407_mengle.pdf. 
21 Gregory R. Duffee & Chunsheng Zhou, Credit Derivatives in Banking: 
Useful Tools for Managing Risk?, 48 J. MONETARY ECON. 25, 26 (2001) 
(“Thus, for now, credit derivatives can be thought of as instruments that 
repackage traded risks into more convenient forms. . . . [C]redit derivatives’ 
flexibility in repackaging risks can, in some circumstances, allow banks to 
trade previously untradeable credit risks.”). 
22 Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of 
Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 
WASH. L. REV. 127, 195 (2009) [hereinafter Gerding, Code, Crash, and 
Open Source] (“[T]hese instruments, including securitizations and credit 
derivatives, enable companies to reduce their cost of capital by 
disaggregating the residual risk traditionally borne by shareholders; 
companies can then offload these risks to more efficient risk bearers.”); 
Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public 
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 231, 252 (2008) (“A company will use risk management instruments 
to transfer those risks that counterparties can manage at lower cost . . . .”). 
23 See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 17, at 221 (“These hedging 
strategies, at least theoretically, facilitate risk-spreading to parties better 
able to bear the risks, including the ‘deep pockets’ of the global capital 
markets.”). 
24 See id. at 221–22 (“This diversification of risk also reduces the likelihood 
that a default will cause any given institution to fail and mitigates the 
impact of any such failure on other institutions . . . .”).  
25 See id. (“The net effect of hedging strategies, however, appears to be a 
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development of credit derivatives has transformed risk management 
and revolutionized the derivatives markets.26  
But with great rewards, come great risks. Specifically, hedge 
transactions undertaken with credit derivatives may carry hidden 
hazards that expose parties to the transaction to new, significant, and 
potentially unmanageable risks.27 Indeed, using credit derivatives to 
hedge always exposes parties to counterparty credit risk, that is, the 
risk that the other party to the transaction will not fulfill its side of 
the bargain.28 Additional potential risks include convergence risk,29 
basis risk,30 and codependent risk.31 The possibility of such risks in a 
hedge-like transaction means that a “hedge” could result in 
additional risks that outweigh the risks that are being mitigated in the 
transaction. Parties to these types of transactions, however, may fail 
to account for these risks because of informational asymmetry and 
negative externalities.32 Consequently, the risks involved in these 
transactions are often unconsidered or improperly priced. 
The London Whale fiasco demonstrated the risks that can 
result from a risky hedge strategy—a possibility that, previously, had 
received little consideration.33 The size of JP Morgan’s profits and 
                                                                                                                           
positive reduction of risk.”). 
26 José Manuel González-Páramo, Member, Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. 
Bank, Some Reflections on the Future of the Market for Credit Derivatives, 
Keynote Address at the 30th International Bürgenstock Meeting 2 (Sept. 9, 
2009) (“[C]redit derivatives and structured credit markets have transformed 
the way banks operated.”). 
27 See OLEG V. BYCHUK & BRIAN J. HAUGHEY, HEDGING MARKET 
EXPOSURES: IDENTIFYING AND MANAGING MARKET RISKS ix (2011) (“Like 
the proverbial wolf in sheep’s clothing, many apparently safe investments 
may contain hidden, and sometimes unexpected, hazards . . . [for example] 
hedge counterparty exposure . . . .”). 
28 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
29 Convergence risk is the concentration of risk in a single entity or segment 
of the market because of converging hedging strategies or counterparties. 
See discussion infra Part III.A. 
30 Basis risk is the risk that the derivative used may not move in tandem 
with the losses a firm experiences. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
31 Codependent risk is the risk that a transaction exacerbates another, 
unrelated risk. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
32 Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Debt as a Lever of Control: The 
Promise and Peril of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1036.  
33 J.P. Morgan’s $2 Billion Blunder, supra note 7, at A2 (“[T]he plan [JP 
Morgan] has been using to hedge risks ‘has proven to be riskier, more 
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the strength of its balance sheet allowed it to absorb billions in 
losses.34 However, it is plausible that another firm or financial 
institution may not have survived losses stemming from a 
comparably risky hedge. The fact is, with the increasingly complex 
hedge strategies that address risk from a broad-based perspective, 
hedges themselves are an unacknowledged source of risk in the 
derivatives markets. This is particularly true of hedges established 
with credit derivatives, such as CDSs and collateralized debt 
obligations (“CDOs”).35 Credit derivatives are a prime example of 
complex derivative instruments that are difficult to price and that 
may expose firms to hidden hazards—even when used in a 
supposedly benevolent manner.36 Importantly, these risks may not 
only jeopardize the stability of the firm that is hedging, but, possibly, 
the entire financial market. 
Recasting hedges as a potential source of risk is salient 
because of the preferential treatment that the Dodd-Frank Act grants 
to hedges.37 Following the global financial crisis of 2008, lawmakers 
decided to end their previously deregulatory approach to the 
derivatives market in an effort to promote financial stability.38 The 
new regulatory framework for derivatives, set forth in Title VII of 
the Act, enacts extensive and far-reaching reforms intended to make 
the derivatives markets more transparent and stable. Among the 
Act’s many methodologies are: re-classification of actors in the 
derivatives markets, limitations on previously permissible activities, 
                                                                                                                           
volatile and less effective as an economic hedge than the firm previously 
believed.’”). 
34 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Peter Eavis, JPMorgan Discloses $2 
Billion in Trading Losses, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2012, 10:11 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/jpmorgan-discloses-significant-
losses-in-trading-group (“For a bank that earned nearly $19 billion last year, 
the trading loss, which could go higher, will not cripple it in any way.”). 
35 See infra Part I.A, for a detailed description of CDSs and CDOs. 
36 See Charles W. Murdock, Credit Default Swaps: Dubious Instruments, 3 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 133, 135 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Murdock_Credit-Default-Swaps1.pdf (“An 
additional concern is the difficulty in adequately pricing CDSs. Since each 
transaction is unique, there is a dearth of market information about each 
particular transaction.”). 
37 See Dodd-Frank Act § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012) (establishing a broad 
exemption for banks to engage in risk-mitigating hedging activities). 
38 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 701–37 (establishing increased regulatory 
oversight of derivatives markets). 
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and re-regulation of other transactions.39 Notably, the new regulatory 
framework consistently exempts hedges from regulatory oversight.40 
Even more significant is that this exemption applies broadly to all 
hedge strategies and derivative instruments, including credit 
derivatives.41  
This Article argues that hedge transactions should not be 
routinely exempt from regulatory oversight. Credit derivatives are 
highly complex financial instruments that may be utilized to 
implement intricate hedging strategies.42 Firms that use credit 
derivatives to offset or neutralize risks may, unknowingly, expose 
themselves to greater risks.43 As such, broad-based exemptions for 
hedge transactions are not prudent. Rather, in order to safeguard the 
stability of the financial markets, regulators should subject credit 
derivative hedges to oversight to minimize the negative ramifications 
of these instruments on the financial markets and other market 
participants. By refusing to regulate credit derivative hedge 
transactions differently, regulators are ignoring a real and potent 
source of systemic risk.44 
This Article represents one of the first critical assessments of 
hedging with credit derivatives. While accepting that hedging is 
beneficial, this Article analyzes the risks that can accompany credit 
derivative-based hedges and the systemic implications of such risks. 
In so doing, the Article addresses a gap in the legal literature on 
                                                          
39 Section 723 of the Dodd-Frank Act imposes a clearing requirement, 
section 737 directs the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) 
to create more position limits, and section 721 defines the various 
classifications of participants. See id. §§ 721–37.  
40 See infra Part II.C.  
41 See Dodd-Frank Act § 619. 
42 WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE 368–72 (2008). 
43 Id. at 371–72. 
44 Systemic risk is the risk that the failure of one or a few firms would have 
a disproportionate effect on the wider economy. See Timothy E. Lynch, 
Gambling by Another Name; The Challenge of Purely Speculative 
Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 67, 101 (2011) [hereinafter Lynch, 
Gambling] (providing various definitions of “systemic risk”); Schwarcz, 
Systemic Risk, supra note 17, at 204 (Systemic risk is “the risk that (i) an 
economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a 
panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or 
institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) 
resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, 
often evidenced by substantial financial market-price volatility.”). 
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hedging with credit derivatives by challenging the underlying 
premise that hedges are always beneficial, regardless of the type of 
instrument used to mitigate risk exposure. By demonstrating that 
credit derivatives hedging can be a source of market instability and 
far-reaching risk, this Article highlights a significant oversight in the 
consideration of systemic risks in the financial markets that the 
Dodd-Frank Act and related regulations were intended to address.  
The Article is structured as follows. Part I provides an 
overview of credit derivatives and hedging. This section discusses 
the functioning of two primary credit derivatives—CDSs and CDOs. 
It highlights how firms offset credit risks with credit derivatives. Part 
II examines the benefits of hedging with credit derivatives, 
highlighting the numerous advantages that make these instruments 
attractive to firms seeking to manage their risk exposure. Further, 
this Part provides an in-depth assessment of the financial regulation 
of hedge transactions. Specifically, Part II traces the development of 
hedge regulation prior to and including the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank Act. Part III analyzes the risks that accompany credit 
derivative hedge transactions and examines whether these risks 
warrant the regulation of credit derivative hedges. Importantly, in 
this Part, a new definition of hedging is suggested in order to address 
many of the risks that arise from these transactions. Part IV discusses 
the shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank Act in addressing the risks 
attendant to using credit derivatives to hedge and proposes 
recommendations to address these deficiencies that also protect the 
financial markets from the potential fallout of risky hedges. 
 
I. Credit Derivatives and Hedging—A Primer 
 
A. What Are Credit Derivatives? 
 
A derivative is a financial instrument whose value derives 
from changes in the value of an underlying asset45 or external event, 
such as rainfall,46 inflation,47 or a natural catastrophe.48 A credit 
                                                          
45 D’Souza et al., supra note 19, at 474 (“Derivatives are financial 
instruments for which value is ‘derived’ from underlying assets, such as 
mortgages, stocks, bonds or other commodities.”).  
46 A weather derivative is based on future weather related occurrences, such 
as rainfall, temperature, snowfall, or frost. See CME GROUP, WEATHER 
PRODUCTS BROCHURE 1 (2013), available at http://cmegroup. 
com/trading/weather/files/weather-products-brochure.pdf (discussing ways 
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derivative is a derivative whose value is linked to the credit 
performance of an underlying asset, corporation, or sovereign.49 
There are many types of derivatives, but all derivatives have 
two foundational building blocks—options and forwards.50 An 
option creates the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell51 an 
                                                                                                                           
weather derivatives assist businesses in managing “exposure to 
temperature-based risk”); see generally CME GROUP, http://cmegroup. 
com/trading/weather (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (listing various weather 
derivatives traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange). 
47 An inflation derivative is linked to the change in inflation as measured by 
inflation indices, such as the Consumer Price Index. For a more detailed 
discussion and explanation of inflation derivatives, see generally JEROEN 
KERKHOF, LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., INFLATION DERIVATIVES 
EXPLAINED: MARKETS, PRODUCTS, AND PRICING (July 2005), available at 
http://the.earth.li/~jon/junk/kerkhof.pdf. 
48 Catastrophe derivatives are based on the occurrence of natural 
catastrophic events, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, or wildfires. 
See Timothy Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding, 
43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 25 (2011) [hereinafter Lynch, Derivatives]. See 
generally Sylvie Bouriaux & Richard MacMinn, Securitization of 
Catastrophe Risk: New Developments in Insurance-Linked Securities and 
Derivatives, 32 J. INS. ISSUES 1 (2009), available at http:// 
insuranceissues.org/V23-32.php; Alexander Muermann, Pricing 
Catastrophe Insurance Derivatives (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working 
Paper No. 3-18, 2003), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
fic/papers/03/0318.pdf.  
49 See Mengle, supra note 20, at 1. 
50 Complex derivatives instruments are combinations of options and 
forwards. See Desmond Eppel, Risky Business: Responding to OTC 
Derivative Crises, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 677, 680 (2002) (“[T]hese 
two basic trades form the building blocks of all other derivative products. 
By modifying and combining options and forward contracts creatively, 
financial innovators have developed a variety of derivatives products, 
including futures, swaps, . . . and other credit derivatives.”); Brent W. 
Kraus, The Use of Regulation of Derivative Financial Products in Canada, 
9 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL SOC. ISSUES 31, 39 (1999) (“Although new and 
innovative financial derivatives continue to appear, these products are either 
hybrids or variants of two building block derivatives: the option and the 
forward.”); Adam R. Waldman, Comment, OTC Derivatives & Systemic 
Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 
1023, 1027–28 (1994) (“All derivative transactions can be traced to 
‘fundamental types of building blocks’ known as forwards and options.”). 
51 If the option entitles one to buy, it is a call option; if the contract entitles 
one to sell, it is a put option. Option Types: Calls & Puts, NASDAQ, 
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underlying asset at a specified price52 on a future date.53 On the other 
hand, a forward contract creates the obligation to buy or sell the 
underlying asset at a specified price on a future date.54 Financial 
                                                                                                                           
http://nasdaq.com/investing/options-guide/option-types-puts-
calls.aspx#ixzz2XkRU8i8h (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (“In the special 
language of options, contracts fall into two categories—[c]alls and [p]uts. A 
[c]all represents the right of the holder to buy stock. A [p]ut represents the 
right of the holder to sell stock.”); Purchase of Put Options, PNC, 
https://pnc.com/webapp/unsec/ProductsAndService.do?siteArea=/pnccorp/P
NC/Home/Personal/Investments+and+Wealth+Management/Wealth+Mana
gement+and+Advice/Asset+Management/Strategies+for+Concentrated+Eq
uity+Positions/Purchase+of+Put+Options (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) 
(“When you buy a put option, you receive the right to sell a stock at a set 
price on some future date.”); see also Call Options, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., 
https://nyse.nyx.com/education/all-about-investing/options/call-options (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2014) (“An option that gives you the right to buy an asset at 
a fixed price is called a ‘call’ option.”). 
52 This is known as the strike price. Janice Revell, How to Profit from 
Market Volatility, FORTUNE, Oct. 17, 2011, at 82 (“To reap more income 
from dividend-paying stocks you already own, you can sell ‘covered calls,’ 
granting another investor the right to buy a stock you own at a higher price 
in the future (known as the strike price).”); Sale of Call Options, PNC, 
https://pnc.com/webapp/unsec/ProductsAndService.do?site 
Area=/pnccorp/PNC/Home/Personal/Investments+and+Wealth+Manageme
nt/Wealth+Management+and+Advice/Asset+Management/Strategies+for+
Concentrated+Equity+Positions/Sale+of+Call+Options (last visited Apr. 16, 
2014) (“The seller of a call option gives the buyer the right to purchase a 
share of stock at a predetermined ‘strike’ price.”).  
53 This is known as the strike date. Norman M. Feder, Deconstructing Over-
The-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 692 (2002) 
(defining the strike date as the date on which an option right expires); see 
also SUNDARAM JANAKIRAMANAN, DERIVATIVES AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
240 (2011). 
54 An exchange-traded forward is a future. Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail 
Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 10 
(1996) (“Futures contracts are standardized forward contracts. They are 
obligations to buy or sell an asset at a specified future date for a specified 
price, and no money changes hands until maturity. The difference is that 
with the standardization of contract terms, the futures contracts are readily 
transferrable. Futures contracts are publicly traded on exchanges . . . .”); see 
also Rhett G. Campbell, Energy Future and Forward Contracts, Safe 
Harbors, and the Bankruptcy Code, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1–3 (2004) (“A 
‘forward contract is a legal agreement to make or take delivery in the 
future’ . . . . A futures contract (i.e., a commodity contract for future 
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institutions use options and forwards to mitigate various risks. For 
example, a publicly traded company may offer its stock as collateral 
for a loan. By accepting this stock as collateral, the bank is exposed 
to a potential fall in stock value. To protect itself against this risk, the 
bank may buy a put option on the common stock. The put option 
insures the banks against a loss in the value of the collateral. If the 
stock loses value, the put option appreciates, thereby neutralizing the 
loss.55  
Derivatives may be categorized as either exchange-traded or 
over-the-counter (“OTC”).56 Exchange-traded derivatives are traded 
on regulated exchanges.57 These exchanges act as an intermediary 
between the parties and guarantee settlement of the contract through 
a central settlement system known as a “clearinghouse.”58 Only 
fungible and liquid contracts that are highly standardized are traded 
on exchanges.59 Many of the basic terms of exchange-traded 
                                                                                                                           
delivery traded on a national or regional exchange) has four distinct 
traits . . . .”). 
55 BRATTON, supra note 42, at 163. 
56 See Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suitability 
Doctrine Is Not Suitable for OTC Derivative Dealers, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
527, 537–38 (1998) (“Derivatives can also be identified by the market in 
which they trade. Derivatives that trade through an organized public 
exchange are referred to as exchange-listed derivatives, which include both 
futures and exchange-listed options. In contrast, derivatives contracts 
privately negotiated between parties without a centralized market are 
referred to as OTC derivatives.”). 
57 Id.  
58 Feder, supra note 53, at 732 (“[A] clearinghouse house concentrates 
payment and delivery risks in a central entity by effectively acting as a 
mandatory counterparty to each party performing or expecting performance 
under a traded contract.”). 
59 AM. STOCK EXCH. ET AL., CHARACTERISTICS AND RISKS OF 
STANDARDIZED OPTIONS 4 (1994), available at http://cboe.com/ 
learncenter/workbench/pdfs/CharacteristicsandRisksofStandardizedOptions.
pdf (“Most options have standardized terms—such as the nature and 
amount of the underlying interest, the expiration date, the exercise price, 
whether the option is a call or a put, whether the option is a physical 
delivery option or a cash-settled option, the manner in which the cash 
payment and the exercise settlement value of a cash-settled option are 
determined, the multiplier of a cash-settled option, the style of the option, 
whether the option has automatic exercise provisions, and adjustment 
provisions.”). For a definition of “fungibility,” see Options Glossary: 
Fungibility, OPTIONS INDUS. COUNCIL, http://optionseducation.org/ 
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derivatives are not subject to negotiation between the parties.60 On 
the other hand, bespoke, highly customized derivatives are traded 
OTC.61 OTC derivatives are bilaterally negotiated between the 
counterparties and are tailored to the needs of the parties.62 The 
unregulated nature of OTC derivatives greatly contributes to their 
popularity, resulting in an OTC market that is many times larger than 
the exchange-traded market.63  
Most credit derivatives are traded OTC, with the most 
popular of them being CDSs.64 CDSs are bilateral contracts in which 
a protection buyer pays a premium to a protection seller in exchange 
for which the protection seller compensates the protection buyer if 
the underlying asset suffers a credit event.65 The underlying asset of 
a CDS can range from the debt of a single corporate issuer or a 
sovereign, to indices linked to these debt instruments.66 If a credit 
                                                                                                                           
tools/glossary.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (“Options listed on national 
exchanges are fungible, while over-the-counter options generally are not.”). 
60 See Feder, supra note 53, at 731–32 (“When purchasing or selling an 
exchange-traded contract, the buyer and seller are obligated by inflexible 
terms and conditions set by the exchange: settlement dates, settlement 
amounts, and contract maturities are standard; option strike prices are 
limited to increments of certain round numbers; settlement is physical . . . . 
Some derivatives contracts that trade on exchanges even limit how much 
the price can move up or down on a given-trading day.”). 
61 Id. at 734 (“OTC derivatives contrast with exchange-traded derivatives 
because the former are made-to-order.”). 
62 Id. at 734–35 (“[P]arties to OTC transactions can tailor individual 
derivatives to specific exposures or for specific risk postures.”). 
63 See Bank for Int’l Settlements, International Banking and Financial 
Market Developments, BIS Q. REV., June 2013, app. A, at A10, available at 
http://bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qs1306.pdf (providing the outstanding notional 
values of OTC and exchange-traded derivative contracts as of December 
2012). 
64 Mengle, supra note 20, at 1 (stating that the “vast majority” of credit 
derivatives take the form of CDSs). 
65 Credit events are performance triggers in CDS contracts. Given the 
importance of credit events, they are meticulously specified in the credit 
derivative contract. Id. at 3. “Credit events” are defined to include: 
“bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation acceleration, obligation default, 
repudiation/moratorium, or restructuring.” See INT’L SWAPS AND 
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2003 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS 30 
(2003), available at https://globalmarkets.bnpparibas.com/gm/features/ 
docs/dfdisclosures/2003_ISDA_Credit_Derivatives_Definitions.pdf. 
66 See Lynch, Derivatives, supra note 48, at 22; see also INDEP. DIRS. 
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event does not occur during the life of the CDS, the contract ends 
with the protection buyer making only the premium payments to the 
protection seller. In an example of a single-name CDS,67 depicted in 
                                                                                                                           
COUNCIL, BOARD OVERSIGHT OF DERIVATIVES: INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
COUNCIL TASK FORCE REPORT 6 (2008), available at 
www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_08_derivatives.pdf (defining a CDS as an “agreement 
in which the protection seller agrees to make a payment to the protection 
buyer in the event of a specified credit event (such as a default on an 
interest or principal payment of a reference entity) in exchange for a fixed 
payment or series of fixed payments”); INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: OLD RISKS, NEW CHALLENGES 57 (2013), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2013/01/pdf/c2.pdf 
(“Although CDS that reference sovereign credits are only a small part of the 
sovereign debt market ($3 trillion notional SCDS outstanding at end-June 
2012, compared with $50 trillion of total government debt outstanding at 
end-2011), their importance has been growing rapidly since 2008, 
especially in advanced economies.”); Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall 
Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 
167, 194 (2011) [hereinafter Things Fall Apart] (“Credit default swaps are 
privately negotiated, bilateral agreements. Credit default swaps are a class 
of swap agreements that typically references debt obligations such as a 
specific debt security (a ‘single-name product’); a group or index of debt 
securities (a ‘basket product’); or collateralized loan agreements, 
collateralized debt obligations, or related indexes. In a credit default swap 
agreement, one party (the ‘protection buyer’) seeks to reduce its risk 
exposure related to a referenced debt asset by entering into an agreement 
with another party (the ‘protection seller’); the protection seller agrees to 
enter into the credit default swap agreement because she seeks to gain 
exposure to the likelihood that the issuer of the reference asset (the 
‘reference entity’) will default on the reference asset. The protection buyer 
pays periodic premiums to the protection seller for this insurance-like 
arrangement. In the event that the reference entity defaults on its obligations 
related to the reference asset, the protection buyer may require the 
protection seller to purchase the reference asset for face value, or some 
percentage of face value agreed upon in the credit default swap agreement, 
less the market value of the security. In short, credit default swap 
agreements involve a transfer of the risk that the issuer of a reference asset 
will default and the reference asset will decline in value.”). 
67 A single-name CDS is a CDS from which protection is written on a single 
entity. Mary Brown, Credit Default Swaps: What Happens in a Credit 
Event?, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2009), http://investopedia.com/ 
articles/bonds/09/what-happens-to-single-name-cds.asp (“A single-name 
CDS is a derivative in which the underlying instrument is a reference 
obligation, or a bond of a particular issuer or reference entity.”). 
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Diagram 1, Firm A has credit exposure to Company Z and seeks to 
offset this exposure. To insure against this risk, Firm A purchases a 
CDS linked to Company Z’s public debt issuance from Firm B. Firm 
A, the protection buyer, makes premium payments to Firm B, the 
protection seller. In the event Company Z defaults on its debt or any 
other stipulated credit event occurs, Firm B will compensate Firm A 
for the loss incurred.68  
 
 
Another important credit derivative is the CDO.69 A CDO is 
a portfolio of debt instruments (assets) that is bought by a special 
purpose vehicle (“SPV”), as demonstrated in Diagram 2 below.70 
The SPV pays for the portfolio by selling interests to the cash flows 
that these debt instruments (assets) generate to investors.71 Interests 
in the debt instruments (assets) are sliced into tranches and issued as 
securities to investors.72 The senior tranche is rated AAA, most 
                                                          
68 For a similar hypothetical, see JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & 
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 564 (7th ed. 2013). 
69 See Houman B. Shadab, Credit Risk Transfer Governance: The Good, the 
Bad, and the Savvy, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1009, 1012 (2012) (“The 
foregoing complex web of contracts was the result of the parties’ attempt to 
transfer credit risk: CDS[s], CDOs, and mortgage-backed securities are all 
instruments of credit risk transfer . . . .”). 
70 See BRATTON, supra note 42, at 370. 
71 M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” 16 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 1, 12–15 (2009); see generally JOHN HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, 
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (Donna Battista et al. eds., 7th ed. 2009).  
72 Marcin Wojtowicz, CDOs and the Financial Crisis: Credit Ratings and 
Fair Premia 5 (Sept. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, VU University 
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insulated from risk, and receives the lowest interest payment.73 The 
junior tranche is the most exposed to risk, and therefore, earns the 
greatest amount of interest.74 If the credit quality of the portfolio 
owned by the SPV declines,75 the SPV makes contractually 
determined payments to the SPV’s sponsor firm. In exchange for this 
protection, the sponsor firm makes periodic payments to the SPV 
that are distributed among the SPV’s investors, along with any 
money generated from the SPV’s assets.76 
 
                                                                                                                           
Amsterdam), available at http://efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/ 
EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2013-Reading/papers/EFMA2013_ 
0216_fullpaper.pdf (“Structured finance transforms corporate bonds and 
other assets . . . into securitized tranches.”).  
73 Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 32, at 1029–30 (“For example, for a tranche 
to be rated AAA, S&P might require that it be able to withstand a default 
rate of 30% of the asset pool for a particular period of time, assuming a 
level of defaults based on the ratings of those assets. The default rate for 
lower credit ratings would be correspondingly higher. The model also 
incorporates assumptions about how much of the face value might be 
recovered after a default.”); see also Wojtowicz, supra note 72, at 5 (“A 
given tranche incurs losses only after all subordinate tranches are wiped out. 
Most of the credit risk is thus concentrated in the first-loss equity tranche, 
which also provides the highest coupon. More senior tranches have lower 
default risks and accordingly offer lower coupons.”). 
74 Cf. Wojtowicz, supra note 72, at 5 (discussing senior tranches which have 
lower default risks and offer lower coupons). 
75 What qualifies as a decline in credit quality would be specified in 
agreements between the SPV and the firm and known to the SPV’s 
investors. For example, a decline in credit quality would be the default of 
one of the loans or bonds included in the portfolio.  
76 COX ET AL., supra note 68, at 570. 
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CDSs and CDOs enable market participants to isolate and 
transfer credit risk without having to liquidate or syndicate the 
underlying debt.77 Credit derivatives, thus, transform credit risk from 
an illiquid, untradeable aspect of debt, to one that can be valued and 
traded.78 The ability to segregate and trade discrete aspects of risk 
has contributed to the exponential growth of credit derivatives.79 
Consequently, credit derivatives have become a fundamental risk 
management tool for firms, as they enable firms to offset varied risks 
with ease.80 Using credit derivatives in this manner is known, 
broadly, as “hedging,” which is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
B.  Hedging in Practice 
 
A hedge is a transaction undertaken to offset or neutralize an 
existing exposure to specific risks.81 Through hedging, entities aim to 
                                                          
77 See Things Fall Apart, supra note 66, at 194 (“Credit default swaps are a 
class of swap agreements that typically references debt obligations such as 
. . . collateralized debt obligations. . . . In a credit default swap agreement, 
one party (the ‘protection buyer’) seeks to reduce its risk exposure related to 
a referenced debt asset by entering into an agreement with another party 
(the ‘protection seller’); the protection seller agrees to enter into the credit 
default swap agreement because she seeks to gain exposure to the likelihood 
that the issuer of the reference asset (the ‘reference entity’) will default on 
the reference asset. The protection buyer pays periodic premiums to the 
protection seller for this insurance-like arrangement. . . . In short, credit 
default swap agreements involve a transfer of the risk that the issuer of a 
reference asset will default and the reference asset will decline in value.”). 
78 See DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GROUP, THE GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKET: AN 
INTRODUCTION 8 (2008), available at http://deutsche-boerse.com/ 
INTERNET/MR/mr_presse.nsf/0/0A4A6E3F8ED836BDC1257457002D56
69/$File/2008-04%20DB_WP%20GlobalDerivativesMarket_ 
e.pdf?OpenElement (discussing how credit derivatives, which provide 
compensation if a creditor defaults on its bonds, can be used as an 
investment). 
79 See id. at 4.  
80 See Duffee & Zhou, supra note 21, at 26 (“Thus, for now, credit 
derivatives can be thought of as instruments that repackage traded risks into 
more convenient forms.”). 
81 Luis Vasco Lourenço Pinheiro & Miguel A. Ferreira, How Do Banks 
Manage Interest Rate Risk: Hedge or Bet? 2 (June 30, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1157672 (“Through the use of hedging strategies, 
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minimize the riskiness associated with their assets. During the 
common law era, courts identified a transaction as a hedge if the 
party to a contract had pre-existing exposure to the risk that the 
contract was intended to mitigate.82 In spite of this seemingly simple 
formulation, one academic sagely commented, “[i]n endeavoring to 
distinguish hedging from wagering, the courts are between the devil 
and the deep sea.”83 Since the common law determination of whether 
a transaction was a hedge turned on the intent of at least one of the 
parties to the contract, which was difficult for the court to determine 
ex post,84 this simple rule did not always yield simple results.85 
In its most basic and ideal form, a hedge is the acquisition of 
a position that is opposite to the risk the entity already faces, such 
that any losses a firm incurs because of said risk are matched by an 
equal gain on the hedge position.86 Because gains and losses are 
                                                                                                                           
managers can put into practice opposite directional bets in order to 
neutralize initial exposure.”). 
82 Lynn Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them, REG., Fall 
2009, at 31–32, available at http://www.cato.org/regulation/fall-2009 
(discussing common law rules regarding hedging). 
83 Edwin W. Patterson, Hedging and Wagering on Produce Exchanges, 40 
YALE L.J. 843, 878 (1931). 
84 Id. at 846. 
85 See State v. Stripling, 21 So. 409, 410–11 (Fla. 1896) (determining that 
futures contracts, because of the moral harm they cause, falls within the 
definition of gambling which is prohibited under the Act for the Better 
Suppression of Gambling); Cunningham v. National Bank of Augusta, 71 
Ga. 400, 405 (1883) (holding that a contract was not enforceable because it 
amounted to gambling in that it induced people to risk an asset with the 
hope that they would see a profit); Rumsey et al. v. Berry, 65 Me. 570, 574 
(1876) (refusing to uphold a contract “entered into without an intention of 
having any wheat pass from one party to the other, but with an 
understanding that at the appointed time the purchaser is merely to receive 
or pay the difference between the contract and the market price”); Brua’s 
Appeal, 55 Pa. 294, 298–99 (1867) (holding that a contract was not 
enforceable because it was like gambling and because the contract lacked 
consideration). 
86 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES 
REGULATION 120 (Successor ed. to COMMODITIES REGULATION, 3d ed. 
2004); John D. Finnerty & Dwight Grant, Alternative Approaches to 
Testing Hedge Effectiveness Under SFAS No. 133, 16 ACCOUNTING 
HORIZONS 95, 99 (June 2002) (“For a perfect hedge, the change in the value 
of the derivative exactly offsets the change in the value of the hedged 
item. . . .”); Wendy C. Perdue, Manipulation in Futures Markets: 
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closely matched, hedgers forfeit the opportunity to profit if market 
conditions change in their favor.87 This “severely restricted 
investment motive” is what many consider to be the hallmark of 
hedging.88 Credit derivatives are particularly well suited to hedging, 
as they facilitate the transfer of risk from one entity that inefficiently 
bears credit risk, to another that is able to bear the risk at a lower cost 
or is more willing to be exposed to the risk.89  
Consider the following example: Bank A extends a loan of 
$100 million to Company B. Company B is a long-time and 
profitable customer of Bank A, so it does not want to syndicate the 
loan. However, because of the large size of the loan, Bank A is 
concerned with the possibility of Company B’s default. Bank A, 
therefore, enters into a CDS with Hedge Fund C based on the credit 
quality of Company B. If Company B defaults on its loan, Hedge 
Fund C will be required to compensate Bank A; in return, Bank A 
makes periodic payments to Hedge Fund C. In this transaction, Bank 
A has offset its risk exposure to Company B—whatever losses it 
incurs in the event that Company B defaults will be mitigated 
through its contractual arrangement with Hedge Fund C. This 
transaction is referred to as a one-to-one hedge or micro-hedge 
because Bank A is hedging a single liability—here, the credit risk of 
Company B.90 
                                                                                                                           
Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 390 (1987) (“First, the 
goal appears to be based on a simplistic understanding of hedging. As 
Holbrook Working has explained, it is inaccurate and simplistic to view the 
‘perfect hedge’ as one where the spread between cash and futures prices 
remains constant and which, therefore, results in no profit or loss. Contrary 
to the assumption of this simplistic view of hedging, Working has explained 
that ‘[m]ost hedging is done in the expectation of a change in spot-future 
price relations.’”). 
87 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 86, at 121-20. 
88 Id. at 121. 
89 Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Change 
the “Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1045 (2009) 
(“Derivatives . . . serve as the modern means of isolating, unbundling, and 
transferring economic risk.”). 
90 In hedging a single asset or liability risk, the party is engaging in 
microhedging. See STEVIE D. CONLON, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL 
DERIVATIVES: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶ A3.04[4] (2012) 
(explaining a microhedge as a “hedge that addresses single asset or liability 
risk—or even a hedge that addresses risk associated with a fairly discrete 
series of assets or liabilities”). 
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While useful in providing the basic framework of CDS 
hedges, this simplistic formulation is but the tip of the iceberg. In 
today’s markets, most hedge transactions, especially those involving 
financial derivatives, are more complex, going far beyond the simple 
formulation of a one-to-one hedge.91 Hedging strategies vary widely 
in complexity and, owing to the malleability of financial derivatives, 
can be tailored to a firm’s risk profile and risk mitigation needs.92 
CDSs may be used to mitigate the risks arising from a wide array of 
assets through a portfolio or macro-hedge.93 In a portfolio hedge, a 
firm takes a broader view of the risks it faces and attempts to 
mitigate its exposure most efficiently.94 Using the example above, if 
Bank A were exposed to the risk of default from Companies D, E, F, 
                                                          
91 Robert O’Harrow, Derivatives Made Simple, If That’s Really Possible, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2010, A13 (“Over the past two decades, derivatives 
have evolved from relatively straightforward deals to highly complex 
transactions . . . .”); Michael Robinson, Experts Warn of Hidden Danger of 
Complex Investments, BBC (July 5, 2011), http://bbc.co.uk/news/business-
13961625 (“But in Britain and elsewhere, complex financial derivatives are 
once again thriving.”). 
92 Popular hedging strategies include anticipatory hedges, strip hedges, and 
rolling hedges. An anticipatory hedge is a transaction that is intended to 
mitigate risks that do not yet exist. CONLON, supra note 90, ¶ A3.04[3]. A 
firm may enter into an anticipatory hedge because of uncertainty as to 
whether a specific hedge instrument may be available at a later date or 
concerns that such hedge transactions may be more expensive in the future. 
Id. However, in undertaking such a hedge, there is the risk that the 
anticipated risk being hedged may never materialize or may not materialize 
as expected, thereby exposing the entity to greater risks. Id. A strip hedge is 
a “series of hedging instruments that are used to hedge payments or 
amounts occurring at different points in time.” Id. ¶ A3.04[5]. A stack or 
rolling hedge is an alternative strategy to a strip hedge if the latter proves to 
be prohibitively expensive. Id. ¶ A3.04[6]. A stack hedge is the use of short-
term hedge transactions to protect against long-term risk exposure. Id. In 
this strategy, the short-term hedge is “rolled forward” by closing out one 
derivative transaction and taking the same position with another derivative 
transaction with a later expiration date. Id. A rolling hedge does not provide 
complete mitigation against risks, as new hedges must be entered into as the 
previous ones expire. Id. 
93 Id. ¶ A3.04[4]. Portfolio hedge may also refer to hedges entered into to 
address enterprise risk. Enterprise risk is the “net price or rate [of] risk of a 
person’s entire activities.” Id. A hedge that addresses enterprise risk 
attempts to mitigate against the risks facing the entire business operations of 
the firm as a whole. Id. 
94 Id. 
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and G, it could purchase protection through a CDS, from Hedge 
Fund C, linked to an index that references the debt of these 
companies. Portfolio hedging may also be accomplished through 
securitization using a CDO.95 Through a CDO, a firm is able to sell 
various sources of credit risk to an SPV and protect itself from 
default in a comprehensive manner.96  
In the examples so far, we have recognized the actions of the 
firm in protecting itself from risks arising from its business 
operations as a hedge. But what of the firms on the other side of 
these transactions? More concretely, if a speculator enters into a 
transaction to offset risk, is this transaction a hedge? A speculator is 
an investor in the derivatives market, who is willing to take on risks 
for a premium.97 Generally, these investors do not have initial 
exposure to the underlying risks, but willingly take on such exposure 
because of their belief in future market movements.98 Speculators 
                                                          
95 See supra Part I.A, for a description of securitization.  
96 Henderson, supra note 71, at 12 (“A CDO is, at its core, the same as a 
CDS contract. As in a CDS contract, the parties to a CDO contract are 
shifting the risk of an underlying debt instrument from lender to investor, 
but instead of doing so for a corporate loan or bond issuance from a single 
borrower they do so for a series of loans or bonds from many borrowers. In 
this way, some portfolio theory-based diversification is achieved, since the 
risk for any investor of any one buyer defaulting is absorbed by gains on 
other debtors that do not default.”). 
97 Feder, supra note 53, at 719 (“Speculators buy or sell derivatives without 
true exposure to or core interest in the underlying risk. There usually is no 
shortage of entities willing to place their money on their view of future 
price movements, regardless of underlying risks they actually face . . . .”); 
see also Lynch, Gambling, supra note 44, at 79 (“According to the ‘risk 
hedging’ theory, a speculator assumes the risk held by another in return for 
a favorable price premium from that other party.”).  
98 Feder, supra note 53, at 719 (“Those without underlying exposure who 
are convinced that the markets will move in a certain direction or that the 
market's judgment of the credit of a given entity is mistaken usually find 
derivatives a particularly useful way to economically test their 
conviction.”); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? 
Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. Rev. 
611, 672 (1995) (“Perhaps the most significant cost associated with 
speculative trading is the cost of speculators’ acquisition and analysis of the 
information on which they base their differing expectations. Investors trying 
to predict which stocks or markets will do well invest enormous time and 
effort gathering and digesting the vast quantities of information relevant to 
the futures of firms, industries, and the market as a whole.”). 
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bear the uneasy designation of being mere gamblers in the 
derivatives markets, but are, nonetheless, needed for the market’s 
liquidity.99 Theoretically, there could be an equal match of hedgers 
who have complementary needs; however, realistically, speculators 
are needed to take on these risks.100 
In the prior example, Hedge Fund C would be a speculator 
because it deliberately exposed itself to the credit risk of Company 
B. To extend the above example, as illustrated in Diagram 3: suppose 
after establishing the CDS with Bank A, Hedge Fund C enters into an 
offsetting transaction with Bank D linked to the debt of Company B. 
In the transaction with Bank D, Hedge Fund C is mitigating its risk 
exposure, similar to Bank A in the prior transaction. Some argue, 
however, that the transaction between Hedge Fund C and Bank D 
differs from that between Bank A and Hedge Fund C. According to 
these arguments, the difference between the transactions is based on 
the fact that Bank A is hedging exposure arising from its business 
operations; whereas, Hedge Fund C is hedging a speculative 
position.101 Per this point of view, such hedging of a speculative 
position is not a “true hedge” and, as such, should not be recognized 
as a hedge. However, to categorize a transaction as a hedge based on 
whether the person offsetting the risk is the primary or secondary 
bearer of the risk may be unsatisfactory and unhelpful. This dividing 
line may not accurately reflect whether the transaction, on balance, 
actually mitigates risk. 
                                                          
99 Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?—
Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the 
Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987, 1014–15 (1992) 
(“[A]lthough driven by selfish motives, speculators provide additional 
liquidity in the markets.”); Lynch, Gambling, supra note 44, at 80 (“[T]he 
existence of speculators creates liquidity in the derivatives market . . . .”). 
100 Lynch, Gambling, supra note 44, at 119 (“[W]ithout speculators, 
potential hedgers would have to find other hedgers with an exactly (or 
nearly exactly) opposite position in order to enter into a derivatives contract 
to hedge their pre-existing risks.”).  
101 See, e.g., id. at 71 (“If a counterparty is not hedging a pre-existing risk 
with the derivatives contract, he is deemed to be a speculator.”). 
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Put another way, categorizing transactions as a hedge only if 
the entity has a pre-existing risk exposure is both too broad and too 
narrow. It is too narrow because it excludes transactions that may 
offset risks in the most optimal manner. On the other hand, it is too 
broad because it includes transactions that may incur more risks than 
they neutralize. This delineation, therefore, is not helpful as it does 
not always reflect whether a transaction is truly mitigating risks or 
merely increasing risk exposure. To impose this restriction is to 
engage in a type of shorthand that may be useful in eliminating some 
sources of risks that arise from credit derivatives hedging, but should 
not be used as a substitute for actual analysis of a transaction to 
determine whether it truly mitigates risk. Therefore, offsetting the 
risks from a speculative position may, in some instances, be a “true 
hedge,” provided that it is aimed more at managing risk exposure 
than increasing it.  
The complexities of the derivatives markets and available 
hedge strategies force reconsideration of the identifying 
characteristics of a hedge. It is, therefore, necessary to look beyond: 
(1) intent—which was previously difficult to discern and has only 
become more difficult, and (2) pre-existing risk exposure—which is 
a poor substitute for identifying whether a transaction is an optimal 
transferal of risk. Nonetheless, it is important that a hedge include 
only those transactions that truly mitigate risk exposure. If 
transactions like those involved in the London Whale fiasco102 are 
treated as hedges, then the definition is so broad as to include 
transactions that are more risky than they are beneficial. On the other 
                                                          
102 See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text (describing the London 
Whale debacle). 
2013-2014 HAZARDOUS HEDGING 839 
 
hand, the definition cannot be so strictly cabined that only the 
narrowest category of transactions is recognized. Both nuance and 
balance are needed. 
As such, a transaction should be recognized as a hedge if it is 
established to mitigate risk exposure and does not introduce new, 
significant risks that outweigh the benefits of the transaction. Such a 
definition of a hedge moves away from questions of primary and 
secondary sources of risk and from issues regarding the intent of the 
hedger. This definition provides a more nuanced view that 
recognizes that hedges may pose risks and acknowledges that these 
risks should be taken into account when categorizing a transaction as 
a hedge.  
Below, the benefits of hedging with credit derivatives, as well 
as attendant risks, are discussed in greater detail. 
 
II. Hedging—Its Benefits and Regulation 
 
A. Benefits of Hedging with Credit Derivatives 
 
In daily operations, one of the most common risks firms face 
is credit risk.103 A manufacturer that sells products to a customer on 
credit is faced with the risk that the customer may not pay for the 
goods. Similarly, a bank that makes a multi-million dollar loan to a 
corporation will be concerned that the corporation may not be able to 
repay the loan. In both examples, the manufacturer and the bank are 
exposed to credit risk. 
Credit derivatives are well suited to hedge against credit 
risks because they allow for the separation and subsequent trading of 
credit risk distinct from the underlying asset or loan.104 Prior to the 
                                                          
103 Credit risk is the risk of non-payment on a loan. See GEORGE CHACKO, 
ANDER SJӧMAN, HIDETO MOTOHASHI & VINCENT DESSAIN, CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES: A PRIMER ON CREDIT RISK, MODELING, AND INSTRUMENTS 
3–4 (2006) (“[C]redit risk is the risk that a borrower won’t pay back the 
lender.”).  
104 See Andrew Scheerer, Credit Derivatives: An Overview of Regulatory 
Initiatives in the U.S. and Europe, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 149, 156 
(2000) (“The purpose of a CDS is to provide credit protection against credit 
losses associated with a default on a specified underlying asset. Typically, 
the underlying or reference asset is some form of credit (e.g., a single credit 
or the first to default in a basket of credits), extended by the party seeking 
protection (the ‘beneficiary’) against a default of its debtor, a third party. 
The beneficiary swaps the credit risk with a provider of credit protection 
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development of credit derivatives, banks and other financial 
institutions addressed these concerns regarding potential default 
through syndication of the loan, which minimized their exposure to a 
single borrower.105 Credit derivatives, however, allow entities to 
maintain customer relationships that may expose them to credit risks, 
yet hedge their risk exposure by transferring the credit risk to 
someone who can bear the risk more efficiently.106 
The impact of this risk transfer is significant. First, it 
increases a firm’s productivity, as a firm is able to focus energy on 
its primary business, with lessened concern for the impact of credit 
losses on its operations.107 Further, by offsetting its exposure to 
credit risk, a firm hedging with credit derivatives is able to reduce 
earnings volatility and, likely, plan aspects of its business operations 
with greater ease.108 In turn, this lowers the costs associated with the 
                                                                                                                           
(the ‘guarantor’). The transaction is similar to a guarantee or a standby letter 
of credit . . . .”).  
105 See Christian A. Johnson, At the Intersection of Bank Finance and 
Derivatives: Who Has the Right of Way?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1, 45 (1998) 
[hereinafter Bank Finance] (“Syndicated loans are loans that involve more 
than one lender. Many large loan transactions can have anywhere from two 
or three lenders to twenty or thirty.”).  
106 See Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage and Financial 
Regulation’s Missing Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 
29, 37 (2011) [hereinafter Gerding, Credit Derivatives]; Gilson & 
Whitehead, supra note 22, at 245–46. In the heyday of the expansion of the 
CDS markets, Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board, described credit derivatives as being necessary for the stability of the 
financial markets. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's Forty-first Annual Conference on 
Bank Structure (May 5, 2005), available at 
http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050505 (“As is 
generally acknowledged, the development of credit derivatives has 
contributed to the stability of the banking system by allowing banks, 
especially the largest, systemically important banks, to measure and manage 
their credit risks more effectively. In particular, the largest banks have 
found single-name credit default swaps a highly attractive mechanism for 
reducing exposure concentrations in their loan books while allowing them 
to meet the needs of their largest corporate customers.”). 
107 See Hull, supra note 71, at 45–66. 
108 Laurin C. Ariail, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act: The Impact of Dodd-Frank on End-Users Hedging 
Commercial Risk in Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets, 15 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 175, 189 (2011). 
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firm’s operations and enables the firm to operate more efficiently.109 
The benefits of eliminating credit risks that a firm is ill-equipped to 
handle have results that extend beyond the firm in question. 
Specifically, in focusing more on its primary business, the firm is 
able to be more innovative in its primary industry and is better 
positioned to offer its goods or services at a lower cost.110 Secondly, 
the transfer of credit risk increases market liquidity.111 Credit 
derivatives allow banks and other lenders to extend loans with a 
lower risk of default.112 As such, lenders are more willing and better 
able to lend more money to additional entities.113 
The popularity of using credit derivatives to hedge against 
credit risk is due, in large part, to their highly customizable nature.114 
                                                          
109 See Keith Sill, The Economic Benefits and Risks of Derivative Securities, 
FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 15, 16, available 
at http://phil.frb.org/research-and-data/publications/business-review/1997/ 
january-february/brjf97ks.pdf (“Derivatives markets are successful 
institutions because they make financial markets more efficient. This 
generally means that borrowing and lending can occur at lower cost than 
would otherwise be the case because derivatives reduce transaction costs. 
For example, more efficient mortgage markets mean that homeowners can 
borrow at lower cost. Similarly, firms can raise funds for investment at a 
lower cost when financial markets are efficient. This in turn can lead to 
faster economic growth.”). 
110 See id. at 16. 
111 Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 32, at 1024. 
112 Id. 
113
 MOORAD CHOUDHRY, STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS: CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 61 (2d ed., 2010) (stating 
that credit derivatives “reduc[e] credit risk with a specific client (obligor) so 
that lending lines to this client are freed up for other business”); Partnoy & 
Skeel, supra note 32, at 1024–25. But see Ronald Fink, Default Swap 
Faults, CFO MAG., Oct. 7, 2004, at 39, 42 (“The advent of credit default 
insurance in the late 1990s led to the widespread expectation that banks 
would be more willing to make loans to companies, since the banks 
wouldn’t be on the hook for defaults by borrowers. But a look back at actual 
practices suggests that those expectations were vastly overblown. While the 
notional value of credit default swaps soared almost six-fold between 2001 
and 2003, from $630 billion to $3.6 trillion, the percentage of bank assets 
made up of loans to companies fell from 20% to 17% during roughly the 
same interval.”). 
114 See COX ET AL., supra note 68, at 561 (“Derivatives are a useful tool to 
hedge risk because of the ability to customize the risk related to the 
reference item and transfer that risk to another via the derivative contract.”). 
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The reference entity of a CDS, for example, can be a single corporate 
entity, an index of corporations, sovereign debt, or any loan 
obligation.115 Because firms can tailor credit derivatives to meet 
specific risk mitigation needs, they can more accurately target and 
reduce their risk exposure.116 A corollary of the customizability of 
credit derivatives is risk diversification. Credit derivatives enable 
firms to diversify their risk exposure, making them less susceptible 
to adverse events affecting a single sector, industry, or client.117 
Two poignant examples of the benefits of hedging with 
credit derivatives occurred during the corporate failures of Enron in 
2001 and WorldCom in 2002.118 Both firms had issued substantial 
corporate debt, but financial institutions, by and large, hedged their 
credit exposure, thereby preventing Enron and WorldCom’s failures 
from spilling over into the banking industry and financial markets.119 
Indeed, former Chairman Alan Greenspan specifically attributed the 
muted impact of the corporate crises of the early 2000s to banks’ use 
of credit derivatives, which “effectively spread losses from defaults 
by Enron, . . . WorldCom, [et al.] . . . over the past year . . . from 
banks . . . to insurance firms, pension funds or others . . . .”120 
                                                          
115 Lynch, Derivatives, supra note 48, at 21–22 (“Examples of transactions 
commonly referred to as derivatives in the marketplace include . . . credit 
default swaps (whose payoffs are derived from the occurrence or non-
occurrence of a ‘credit event’ of some reference entity or entities, such as 
the bankruptcy of an identified corporation, a debt default by some foreign 
government, or the third default within a basket of bonds).”). 
116 COX ET AL., supra note 68, at 561. 
117 See Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit 
Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 657 (2009) 
(“[U]sing a credit default swap, a bank can buy or sell all or a portion of a 
borrower’s credit risk without transferring the loan or bond itself, enabling 
it to more efficiently manage and diversify exposure . . . .”). 
118 FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK 
CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 376 (2003) (“Bankers and bank 
regulators applauded credit default swaps for their ability to shift risks away 
from banks . . . the simultaneous bankruptcies of Enron, Global Crossing, 
and WorldCom would have decimated the banking industry. But even after 
a myriad of defaults of 2001 and 2002, the banks were doing just fine.”). 
119 Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 32, at 1024 (“By limiting their exposure, 
banks averted what could have been a parallel wave of banking failures.”). 
120 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address Before the Council 
on Foreign Relations (Nov. 19, 2002), available at http://cfr.org/monetary-
policy/conversation-alan-greenspan/p5249. Former Chairman Greenspan 
has since changed his view on CDSs, admitting, “Credit-default swaps, I 
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While only some of the benefits of credit derivatives are 
highlighted here, the advantages of using these instruments are 
linked, generally, to their ability to disperse risk among entities. This 
risk dispersion strengthens and stabilizes the markets and firms 
operating in these markets, as they are better able to withstand 
shocks to the markets or unanticipated losses.121 These risk 
management benefits were lawmakers’ primary focus when they 
decided how to police the derivatives markets under the Dodd-Frank 
Act.122 As such, hedging became an important categorization in the 
regulation of derivatives—granting broad exemptions to these types 
of transactions within the regulatory schema.  
 
B. Historical Regulatory Approach to Hedge 
Transactions 
 
Although options and forwards date back millennia,123 swaps 
were not part of the financial landscape until the 1980s, with credit 
default swaps making their debut in the 1990s.124 Federal regulation 
                                                                                                                           
think, have serious problems associated with them.” See Alistair Barr, 
Greenspan Sees ‘Serious Problems’ with CDS: Comment Comes After 
Former Fed Chairman Praised Credit-Default Swaps in 2002, 
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 23, 2008, 2:47 PM), http://marketwatch. 
com/story/greenspan-says-credit-default-swaps-have-serious-problems. 
121 Credit Derivatives: Effects on the Stability of Financial Markets, 
CURRENT ISSUES (Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt, Germany), June 9, 
2004, at 2 (“This results in a more efficient allocation of risks within the 
economy. Economic shocks such as a slump in growth or, more especially, 
crises in specific sectors or companies can be better absorbed as the 
associated costs are lower in total and less concentrated.”). 
122 COX ET AL., supra note 68, at 567. 
123 Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the 
Regulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 
5 (1994) (“Historians have traced transactions in derivative instruments to 
2000 B.C.”).  
124 Partnoy, supra note 118, at 374. The first currency swap occurred in 
1981 between IBM and the World Bank. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: 
HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS 
CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE ix 
(2009). The swap allowed IBM to swap its bond obligations and earnings 
denominated in Swiss francs and Deutsche marks for surplus dollars held by 
the World Bank. Id. By the mid-1990s, bankers at JP Morgan came up with 
the idea to swap default risks on loans, so as to reduce the riskiness of the 
loans, without syndicating the loans or losing the client relationship. Id. In 
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of options and futures was first enacted in the early 1900s.125 Initial 
regulation of derivatives focused on stamping out rampant 
speculation that dominated the futures markets in the form of 
“bucket shops.”126 Bucket shops, considered akin to gambling 
houses, proliferated in the 1800s and early 1900s and were the 
source of numerous manipulative and fraudulent schemes.127 In an 
                                                                                                                           
1994, JP Morgan brokered the first credit default swap between Exxon and 
the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”). Id. 
Exxon needed to open a line of credit with JP Morgan to cover potential 
liability for the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. Id. JP Morgan sold the risk of 
default on the loan to the EBRD, and in exchange paid EBRD a fee for 
taking on the risk. Id.  
125 See Hazen, supra note 99, at 1017 n.165 (“See 7 U.S.C. § 6a(4) (1989). 
This was the eventual predecessor of section 21 of the Future Trading Act 
of 1921, 42 Stat, 198 (Aug. 24, 1921) . . . .”). Some states regulated early 
derivative transactions through the enactment of stock jobbing legislation, 
which prohibited betting on the change in value of the stock of public 
corporations. See Stock Jobbing Laws: Bill to Prohibit Short Scales Recalls 
Early Anti-Trading Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1908, at 10. 
126 Bucket shops were “storefronts that took commodities orders but rarely 
had offsetting obligations,” thereby promoting outright and blatant 
gambling on the future price movement of the underlying commodities. Id. 
at 1014. In these transactions, there was never any intent to deliver the 
underlying commodity, nor did any of the parties to the transaction have a 
prior or future ownership interest in the underlying contract. Id. 
Consequently, these transactions, also known as difference contracts, were 
simply a gamble on price fluctuations. Id. at 1014–15; see Lynn A. Stout, 
Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the 
Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 721 (1999) [hereinafter 
Stout, Hates Speculators] (“Modern legislation has largely replicated, and 
in important ways strengthened, the common law rule against difference 
contracts. Codification of the rule first began in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, when a large number of state legislatures passed 
‘antibucketshop’ laws declaring contracts for the sale of goods illegal unless 
settled by delivery. Like the common law, many of these statutes contained 
exclusions for organized futures trading and for indemnity agreements 
where one of the parties could prove a hedging purpose.”). 
127 Hazen, supra note 99, at 1014–16 (“[T]he first attempts to regulate 
financial speculation predated both state and federal securities laws and 
were based on prohibitions against gambling. . . . The absence of an 
enforceable delivery obligation thus meant that there was great potential for 
fraud.”); Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the 
Commodities Exchange Act: A Call for Alternatives, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 54–55 (“[I]t should be remembered that Section 4 of the CEA 
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effort to circumscribe the rampant speculation of bucket shops, 
federal law created a contract market monopoly in which futures 
contracts were considered illegal unless they were traded on a 
commodities exchange.128 
Congress enacted the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”)129 
in 1936 to prevent manipulation, fraud, and excessive speculation on 
the commodities futures markets and promote the integrity of the 
market.130 To further these goals, the CEA established a delivery 
                                                                                                                           
originally required futures trading to be conducted on futures exchanges for 
the purpose of stopping so-called ‘bucket shops,’ which were simply 
gambling dens for betting on price changes in commodities.”); Kevin T. 
Van Wart, Preemption and the Commodity Exchange Act, 58 CHI. KENT L. 
REV. 657, 662–63 (1982) (“[M]any states responded to the ‘speculative 
spirit which . . . prevailed pre-eminently’ during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century by enacting bucket-shop legislation. These statutes 
treated ‘bucketing’ as a form of gambling and made futures contracts 
criminally illegal where the parties to the agreement never intended delivery 
of the underlying commodity but were dealing only for its prospective rise 
or fall in price.”). 
128 Hazen, supra note 99, at 1016.  
129 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–26 (2012). 
130 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-74 THE 
COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT: ISSUES RELATED TO THE COMMODITIES 
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION’S REAUTHORIZATION app. II (May 1999) 
(“The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) of 1936 was passed after the grain 
price collapse of 1933—believed to be a result of continued market 
manipulation and the failure of a large brokerage house. The act provided 
for more extensive regulation of the markets and their participants . . . 
provided for the Secretary of Agriculture to (1) impose limits on speculative 
trading in futures or in the underlying commodity (speculative position 
limits) and (2) specify thresholds for the mandatory reporting of large 
positions in futures or in the underlying commodity (large trader reporting); 
specifically outlawed fraudulent conduct in connection with futures trades 
by members of contract markets and certain affiliated persons; prohibited 
specific forms of sham trading and any transaction used to cause an 
artificial price . . . expanded the activities subject to criminal (misdemeanor) 
sanctions to include fraud, manipulation, off-exchange trading, and 
violations of speculative trading limits . . . .”); William L. Stein, The 
Exchange-Trading Requirement of the Commodities Exchange Act, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 473, 478 (1998) (“The legislation extended regulatory 
coverage to additional commodities, gave a commission the power to 
impose speculative position limits, outlawed various fraudulent activities, 
and added to the arsenal of sanctions available to punish violators. In 
enacting the CEA, Congress emphasized again the paramount policy 
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requirement for all futures contracts or, alternately, an offset 
mechanism to enable settlement without delivery.131 To minimize the 
impact of speculative positions on the commodities markets, the 
CEA directed the CFTC to impose limits on the size of any one 
trader’s open positions in a given commodity.132 As required by the 
CEA, the CFTC, in conjunction with the regulated exchanges, 
establishes these limits, known as position limits.133 The CFTC 
establishes limits for those commodities it believes are most 
susceptible to market manipulation and excessive speculation.134 For 
any commodity that is not subject to a CFTC-stated position limit, 
the CFTC requires the exchanges to set position limits.135 The narrow 
definition of hedging required that the party who sought the 
exemption have a direct and specific exposure to the price risks 
being hedged.136 In so defining hedging, Congress sought to simplify 
the identification of a hedger by basing the definition on pre-existing 
risk exposure.137  
 Market participants, however, found the narrow definition of 
hedging to be too restrictive to allow them to take full advantage of 
the benefits of risk management through the commodities markets.138 
                                                                                                                           
concerns of preventing manipulation and of outlawing bucket shops.”). 
131 See Stout, Hates Speculators, supra note 126, at 718–22 (“Traders who 
buy exchange-traded futures are technically entitled to demand delivery. As 
a practical matter, however, most exchange-traded futures are settled 
through an “offset” process in which one party to the contract extinguishes 
her obligation by reentering the pit and purchasing a second, offsetting 
contract. Thus a trader obligated to sell 100 bushels of wheat on May 1 
might offset her obligation by purchasing a contract to buy 100 bushels on 
May 1, absorbing the price difference as profit or loss. . . . Thus the 
centerpiece of the CEA is an ‘exchange trading requirement’ that 
reincarnates, in a modified statutory form, the common law rule requiring 
contracts of sale for future delivery to be settled by actual delivery.”). 
132 See Commodity Exchange Act § 4a(a). 
133 See Exchange-Set Speculative Position Limits, 17 C.F.R. § 150.5 (2013).  
134 See id. § 150.5(b); Dan M. Berkovitz, Gen. Counsel, CFTC, Position 
Limits and the Hedge Exemption, Brief Legislative History, Testimony 
Before the CFTC (July 28, 2009), available at http://cftc.gov/ 
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement072809. 
135 See 17 C.F.R. § 150.5 (allowing the “contract market” to set levels). 
136 See id.  
137 See id.  
138 The severe restrictions of the definition of a bona fide hedge were fully 
evident in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 
1956). In this case, the Secretary of Agriculture accused Corn Products 
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In response to market complaints and adverse court decisions,139 
Congress modified the definition of a bona fide hedge.140 With the 
passage of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act in 
1974, the CFTC was created and the CEA amended to remove the 
statutory definition of a bona fide hedge.141 One of the first tasks of 
the newly created agency was to craft a more functional definition of 
hedge that addressed the concerns of market participants regarding 
flexibility, but still honored Congressional desire to eliminate fraud 
and market manipulation.142 The CFTC expanded the definition of a 
                                                                                                                           
Refining Company (“Corn Products”) of exceeding the position limits on 
speculative trading in corn futures. Id. at 556. Corn Products responded by 
stating that its trading qualified as bona fide hedging, as the trades were 
based on forecasts of its anticipated needs for corn and its by-products in 
the future. Id. at 561. The court, adopting a strict interpretation of hedging, 
found that Corn Products was not a hedger under the CEA because it did 
not have fixed price contracts for the sale of its products at the time of the 
trades. Id. at 558. According to the court, anticipated sales were not binding 
obligations and, as such, could not be hedged against. Id. at 562. In short, 
the court refused to recognize anticipatory hedging as a legitimate hedging 
strategy that would entitle a firm to the bona fide hedge exemption. Id.  
139 See id. at 562. 
140 In response to Corn Products, Congress amended the CEA and brought 
anticipatory hedging within the definition of bona fide hedging. See Pub. L. 
No. 778, ch. 690, 70 Stat. 630 (1956) (stating that the CEA was amended by 
inserting a new paragraph, which said “an amount of such commodity the 
purchase of which for future delivery shall not exceed such person’s 
unfilled anticipated requirements for processing or manufacturing during a 
specified operating period not in excess of one year”). 
141 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 
§ 101A, 88 Stat. 1389, 1395 (1974) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2(a)(1) (2012)) (creating the CFTC); id. § 404 (authorizing Secretary of 
Agriculture to modify definition of “bona fide hedging”); Conforming 
Amendments to Orders Prescribing Limits on Positions and Daily Trading 
in Certain Commodities, 40 Fed. Reg. 15,086 (Apr. 4, 1975) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 150). 
142 Federal Speculative Position Limits for Referenced Energy Contracts and 
Associated Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 4150 (Jan. 26, 2010) (“Prior to 1974, 
the CEA included a limited statutory hedging definition . . . . When the 
Commission was created in 1974, the Act’s definition of commodity was 
expanded . . . . Congress was concerned that the limited hedging definition, 
even if applied to newly regulated commodity futures, would fail to 
accommodate the commercial risk management needs of market participants 
that could emerge over time. Accordingly, Congress, in section 404 of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, repealed the 
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bona fide hedge, such that a transaction no longer required an 
identical underlier for a transaction to be considered a hedge.143 
Rather, a hedge would be recognized if the underlier were either 
“normally a substitute” or “economically appropriate” to reduce risk 
exposure.144 In subsequent agency interpretive releases, the CFTC 
clarified that the bona fide hedge exemption was intended to apply to 
“the broad scope of risk-shifting transactions which may be possible 
in the diverse types of futures contracts now under regulation.”145 
 As the CFTC liberalized its view of hedging, it also tried to 
remain true to the established regulatory goals of preventing fraud 
and market manipulation. Notably, the agency’s broader approach to 
hedging was indicative of its burgeoning laissez-faire approach to 
regulation of the commodities market.146 This attitude coincided with 
                                                                                                                           
statutory definition and gave the Commission the authority to define bona 
fide hedging.”). 
143 See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z)(1) (2005). 
144 Id. Specifically, a bona fide hedge transaction was any transaction on a 
contract market that “normally represent[ed] a substitute for transactions to 
be made or positions to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing 
channel, and where they are economically appropriate to the reduction of 
risks in the conduct and management of a commercial enterprise and where 
they arise from” the potential change in value of assets, liabilities, or 
services. Id. Further, to qualify as a bona fide hedge, the transaction must 
have as its purpose offsetting price risks incidental to commercial cash 
operations. See id. § 1.3(z)(2)(iv). In addition, the definition listed specific 
examples of transactions that would qualify for bona fide hedge treatment. 
These enumerated cases harkened back to the requirements of sameness of 
prior definitions. The enumerated transactions included: (i) sales of futures 
that do not exceed currently owned quantities or twelve months’ 
anticipatory production of the same commodity by the same person; (ii) 
purchases of futures that do not exceed fixed-priced sales or twelve months’ 
anticipatory requirements of the same commodity by the same person; (iii) 
offsetting sales and purchases of futures that do not exceed in quantity the 
same commodity that has been bought by the same person; and (iv) sales 
and purchases of futures to be offset by another commodity provided it is 
substantially related to the actual anticipated cash position. Id. § 1.3(z)(2). 
145 Clarification of Certain Aspects of the Hedging Definition, 52 Fed. Reg. 
27,195, 27,196 (1987) (quoting 42 Fed Reg. 14,833 (1977)). Further, in the 
interpretive release, the CFTC also recognized cross-hedging and balance 
sheet hedging as legitimate hedging strategies that, generally, could be 
recognized as a bona fide hedge. Id. at 27,196. 
146 Andrew Notini, Paper Tiger: The Validity of CFTC Position-Limit 
Rulemaking Under Dodd-Frank, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185, 185 (2013) 
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the development and mainstream acceptance of the Efficient Capital 
Markets Hypothesis (“ECMH”).147 The ECMH posits that the price 
of an asset incorporates all relevant information, thereby reflecting 
the intrinsic or “true” value of the asset.148 With regulators believing 
in the efficiency of the markets, regulatory focus expanded to 
accommodate market efficiency as a primary goal of financial 
regulation.149 
 Guided by the ECMH, regulators saw their role within the 
markets as enabling efficiency without intrusive regulations.150 As 
such, the CFTC only mandated position limits on a handful of traded 
commodities, leaving it up to the exchanges to establish position 
limits as they saw appropriate.151 The decreased regulatory focus on 
                                                                                                                           
(“Preceding these events [i.e., the 2007 financial crisis] was a period of 
laissez-faire financial regulation wherein major financial institutions and 
capital markets were largely left to regulate themselves.”). 
147 The ECMH gained widespread acceptance in the 1970s, specifically with 
the publication of Eugene Fama’s article Efficient Capital Markets: A 
Review of Theory and Empirical Work. See generally Eugene Fama, 
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383 (1970). The CFTC began broadening its definition of a bona fide 
hedge in 1976 by refraining from reimposing prior Congressional 
requirements of sameness. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z)(1).  
148 Hazen, supra note 99, at 987 (“According to the [ECMH], the market 
establishes and maintains stock prices at a level that bears a rational 
relationship to the ‘true value’ of a publicly traded company, because the 
price reflects the total mix of information available and accounts for the 
various sectors of the investor community.”). Eugene Fama defined three 
forms of market efficiency. Fama, supra note 147, at 383. Under the weak 
form of market efficiency, only historic price information is included in the 
current market price. Id. Under the semi-strong form of market efficiency, 
all public information is included in the current market price. Id. Under the 
strong form of market efficiency, all information, both public and private, is 
included in the current market price. Id.  
149 H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 14 (1990) (“[A]n effective enforcement 
program is necessary to maintain investor confidence in the integrity, 
fairness, and efficiency of our . . . markets.”). 
150 See Hazen, supra note 99, at 1024 (“[T]he current laissez-faire approach 
is based upon [the premise] of . . . market efficiency.”). 
151 Speculative Limits, CFTC, http://cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/ 
MarketSurveillance/SpeculativeLimits/index.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 
2014) (“Most physical delivery and many financial futures and option 
contracts are subject to speculative position limits. For several markets 
(corn, oats, wheat, soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal, and cotton), the 
limits are determined by the Commission and set out in Federal regulations 
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position limits meant a concomitant de-emphasis on the bona fide 
hedge classification. Further, and more notably, the explosion in the 
OTC derivatives market in the 1990s diminished the importance of 
the bona fide hedge exemption.152 Parties to OTC transactions were 
unconcerned with being designated a hedger, as position limits and 
the bona fide hedge exemption apply only to exchange-traded 
transactions.153 Aided in part by the hands-off approach of regulators 
towards the derivatives market, OTC transactions flourished.154 
Indeed, by year-end 1998, the Bank for International Settlements 
estimated the outstanding notional value of OTC derivatives at 
US$72 billion155 and by 2000, estimated the value had risen to over 
US$95 billion.156  
 The laissez-faire approach of regulators culminated with the 
adoption of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
(“CFMA”).157 The CFMA explicitly prohibited the CFTC or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) from regulating OTC 
derivatives158 and clarified the legality of off-exchange derivatives.159 
                                                                                                                           
(CFTC Regulation 150.2, 17 CFR 150.2). For other markets, the limits are 
determined by the exchanges.”).  
152 GARY J. SCHINASI, R. SEAN CRAIG, BURKHARD DREES & CHARLES 
KRAMER, MODERN BANKING AND THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
SYSTEMIC RISK 9, 36 (INT’L MONETARY FUND 2000). 
153 Id. at 18. 
154 Id. at 9. 
155 Serge Jeanneau, International Banking and Financial Market 
Developments, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV., Feb. 2000, at 31, 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/r_qt0002.pdf. 
156 Id. at 36. 
157 Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 
114 Stat. 2763A (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 
U.S.C.).  
158 Derivatives, SEC, https://sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
159 Per the Commodities Exchange Act, off-exchange transactions were not 
legally enforceable. During the period of growth for OTC transactions, 
there was some uncertainty as to whether these OTC contracts were illegal. 
However, after the enactment of the CFMA, such uncertainties were 
resolved in favor of these transactions’ legality. Stein, supra note 130, at 
473–74 (“The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) makes it illegal to trade a 
contract for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery—a 
‘futures contract’—unless the contract is executed on a federally designated 
exchange. . . . [T]his central premise of futures regulation recently has been 
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Importantly, the CFMA further marginalized the reach of the bona 
fide hedge exemption and reflected the changed regulatory focus 
from prevention of fraud to the promotion of market efficiency.160 It 
is debatable whether the liberalized policies of the CFMA were 
necessary to facilitate greater market efficiency or if these policies 
merely resulted in the 2008 financial crisis.161 What was evident was 
that with the majority of derivatives transactions occurring off-
exchange, the impact of the bona fide hedge categorization on the 
market was limited. However, the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act 
                                                                                                                           
attacked as unworkable and undesirable. Some . . . claim that even if such 
transactions fall within the letter of the requirement, off-exchange 
transactions do not implicate the trading restriction's policy concerns. In 
contrast, others suggest that off-exchange transactions threaten the safety 
and soundness of the international financial system, and violate the clear 
language of the CEA.”); Memorandum from Cravath, Swaine & Moore 
LLP on Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 to the Members of 
the Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n 10–11 (Jan. 5, 2001), available at 
http://isda.org/speeches/pdf/analysis_of_commodity-exchange-act-
legislation.pdf (“Until amended by the Act, the CEA required that futures 
contracts be traded on a regulated exchange. A futures contract traded off an 
exchange was illegal and unenforceable. . . . The development of OTC 
derivatives transactions since the early 1980’s reduced this clarity and led to 
concerns about the enforceability of certain derivatives transactions under 
the CEA.”); Taking Stock of Derivatives: Commodity Exchange Act and 
CFTC Face Uncertain Futures, FAS 133 Arrives in Y2K, 2 STROOCK 
CAPITAL MKTS. (Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 
2000, at 1 [hereinafter Taking Stock of Derivatives], available at 
http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub87.pdf (“The central tenet of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) is that ‘futures contracts’ (which are 
standardized and may be readily offset) must be traded on regulated 
exchanges. . . . As the market for OTC derivatives—such as swaps, 
commercial options and hybrid securities—began to emerge in the mid-
1980s, concerns arose over the ‘legal risk’ that these transactions might 
constitute illegal ‘off-exchange’ futures contracts.”).  
160 See Taking Stock of Derivatives, supra note 159, at 1. 
161 According to Professor Lynn Stout, the CFMA was the direct and 
foreseeable cause of the 2008 financial crisis because it sanctioned the 
“wholesale removal of centuries-old legal constraints on speculative trading 
in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.” Lynn Stout, Derivatives and the 
Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); 
see also Lynn Stout, Uncertainty Dangerous Optimism, and Speculation: 
An Inquiry into Some Limits of Democratic Governance, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1177, 1178 (2012) (“[D]isagreement-based speculative trading 
represents a form of market failure that deserves attention.”). 
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in 2010 changed this status quo significantly and the hedge 
exemption became, once again, en vogue. 
 The bona fide hedge exemption was initially adopted as part 
of a regulatory framework primarily designed to eliminate fraud and 
curb market manipulation.162 The Dodd-Frank Act breathed new life 
into the significance of transactions being designated hedges, as 
many notable exemptions from the far-reaching derivatives 
regulatory framework hinged on whether a transaction is classified as 
a hedge for regulatory purposes.163 As will be seen in the discussion 
below, while legislators were focused on monitoring and minimizing 
activities and actors that pose systemic concerns to the markets, the 
consistent exemption of hedge transactions indicated the unwavering 
belief of lawmakers that hedging was not a source of systemic risk in 
the markets. Thus, under the regulatory framework promulgated by 
the Dodd-Frank Act, the main questions are whether the hedge 
exemption remains appropriate given (1) the growth and complexity 
of derivatives transactions, particularly credit derivatives and (2) the 
focus of the Dodd-Frank Act on reducing systemic risk. 
 
C. The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Hedge 
Exemptions 
  
Among other things, the 2008 crisis highlighted the failure 
of the prior deregulatory approach that valued efficiency and 
financial innovation above all else; a new approach was needed. 
Congress responded to the financial crisis by enacting the Dodd-
Frank Act.164 The stated purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act is: “[t]o 
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too 
big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to 
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for 
other purposes.”165 The Dodd-Frank Act is described as the most 
                                                          
162 See discussion of bucket shops as the evil targeted by the CEA, supra 
note 126 and accompanying text. 
163 See infra Part II.C. 
164 Mark Koba, Dodd-Frank Act: CNBC Explains, CNBC (May 11, 2012, 
4:01 PM), http://cnbc.com/id/47075854 (“Dodd-Frank [is] a comprehensive 
and complicated piece of financial regulation born out of the Great 
Recession of 2008.”). 
165 The long title of the Dodd-Frank Act is: “The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, an Act to promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency 
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extensive “overhaul” of the financial markets “since the Great 
Depression.”166 It affects nearly all aspects of the financial, 
insurance, and consumer finance industries, creating new agencies 
and offices and eliminating others.167 
 The dramatic failures of Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Bear 
Stearns,168 along with the role of OTC credit derivatives in their 
downfall, impressed upon lawmakers the need to regulate the OTC 
derivatives market given its size, magnitude, and impact on the 
financial markets.169 Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act—titled the 
Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act—addresses the 
perceived shortcomings of the derivatives market.170The title 
mandates clearing of OTC derivatives contracts,171 implements 
                                                                                                                           
in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes.” Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 
(2010).  
166 Ben Protess, Deconstructing Dodd-Frank, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at 
F12. 
167 For example, the Treasury Department created the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council and eliminated the Office of Thrift Supervision. See 12 
U.S.C. § 5321 (2012). 
168 See generally Saving Wall Street: The Last Resort, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 
2008, at 86. 
169 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S5874 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Saxby Chambliss) (“As ranking member of the Agriculture 
Committee, I have spent a great deal of time understanding the over-the-
counter derivatives market—its complexities, and its legitimate utility. I 
have found that both Republicans and Democrats generally agree on the 
major issues relating to derivatives regulation. We all generally agree there 
needs to be greater transparency, registration, more clearing, and 
compliance with a whole host of business conduct and efficient market 
operation regulations. This is important, because it is a 180-degree shift 
away from current law where over-the-counter swaps are essentially 
unregulated today.”); see also id. at S5881 (statement of Sen. Hutchinson) 
(“I wish to return to the aftermath of the financial crisis, when Congress 
was tasked with the responsibility of modernizing our financial regulatory 
structure so that we would have proper oversight of today's banking system 
and financial markets. . . . Thus, were financial regulatory reform to 
succeed, we needed to enhance mortgage underwriting standards, bring 
greater transparency to the derivatives markets, and once and for all end too 
big to fail. The conference report before us takes steps toward these 
goals.”). 
170 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 701–7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8301–44 (2012). 
171 Dodd-Frank Act § 723. 
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reporting and recordkeeping systems for derivative transactions,172 
and creates new classifications of derivatives users.173 
This new derivatives regulatory design revived the 
importance of hedging. Under this regime, hedging is no longer 
solely important to avoid position limits; rather, it provides a much-
valued exemption from many of Dodd-Frank’s more onerous 
requirements.174 Specifically, the hedging exemption touches four 
important provisions in Title VII: (1) the clearing mandate; (2) the 
definition of a major swap participant; (3) the Volcker Rule; and (4) 
the Swaps Push-Out Rule. Each of these provisions is discussed 
below. 
 
1. The Clearing Mandate and Major Swap 
Participant Definition 
 
One of the primary charges leveled against the OTC 
derivatives market was its lack of transparency.175 This opacity made 
it possible for risks to build up, unnoticed, in the financial markets, 
as evidenced by AIG’s collapse.176 To address this issue, Title VII 
requires that all derivatives the CFTC determines should be cleared 
must be traded through a central counterparty clearinghouse.177 
Further, all standardized CDSs must be cleared unless an exemption 
is available.178 This clearing mandate is intended to reduce risks, 
                                                          
172 Id. § 727. 
173 Id. § 721(a)(33). 
174 See, e.g., id. § 619 (the Volcker Rule) (establishing a broad exemption 
for banks to engage in risk-mitigating hedging activities). 
175 See, e.g., Colleen Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-
Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1306 (2010); see also 
Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 32, at 1036. 
176 Baker, supra note 175, at 1306. 
177 Dodd-Frank Act § 723. A central counterparty clearinghouse provides 
central clearing for previously OTC traded derivatives. Ariail, supra note 
108, at 185 (“Under central counterparty (CCP) clearing, market 
participants post a set amount of initial margin to the CCP. Depending on 
how the CCP is organized, in some cases it will convert the bilateral 
contracts cleared by members into two separate contracts—one with the 
CCP and another with each party involved. Since the CCP takes the place of 
the counterparty, the market participant is no longer exposed to the credit 
risk of the counterparty, but instead that of the CCP . . . .”).  
178 See Dodd-Frank Act § 723(h)(1)(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person 
to engage in a swap unless that person submits such swap for clearing to a 
2013-2014 HAZARDOUS HEDGING 855 
 
especially counterparty credit risk, inherent in the trillion-dollar OTC 
market by forcing many of these previously privately negotiated 
contracts onto central exchanges.179 
The clearing mandate is one of the most significant 
components of Title VII and the new derivatives regulatory 
framework. As such, the only exception to the clearing mandate is 
for transactions undertaken by non-financial entities to “hedge or 
mitigate commercial risk” (“HMCR” or “hedge standard”).180 
Known as the “end-user exemption,” it gives non-financial hedgers 
the benefit of deciding whether to submit a hedge transaction to a 
central exchange or to trade it OTC.181 Among other advantages, 
end-users hedging with non-cleared derivatives can use non-liquid 
assets to meet margin requirements, thereby making liquid assets 
available for more immediate business needs.182 The end-user 
exemption was necessary and significant in the opinion of many 
lawmakers—commercial end-users had not contributed to the crisis 
and should not be deprived of a necessary risk management tool, 
they argued.183 
                                                                                                                           
derivatives clearing organization that is registered under this Act or a 
derivatives clearing organization that is exempt from registration under this 
Act if the swap is required to be cleared.”). 
179 Baker, supra note 175, at 1306 (“For derivatives traded on exchanges or 
cleared through individual CCPs, the counterparty is the CCP itself. 
Therefore, market participants are only exposed to the credit risk of the 
CCP.”). 
180 See Dodd-Frank Act § 723(2)(h)(7). 
181 Banking Industry Urges SEC and CFTC to Include Small Banks, 5 
HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY, Mar. 21, 2011, at 1, available at 2011 
WL 11533830 (“The Dodd-Frank Act mandates new clearing requirements 
for swaps, but provides an exception for end-users if they use these 
derivatives to hedge or mitigate commercial risk.”). 
182 JEFFREY J. NICHOLS & KENNETH ADAMS, HAYNES & BOONE, LLP, 
WHAT DOES “HEDGE OR MITIGATE COMMERCIAL RISK” MEAN? 4 (Sept. 5, 
2012), available at http://haynesboone.com/files/Uploads/Documents/ 
Attorney%20Publications/Updated-Hedging-or-Mitigating-Commercial-
Risk-paper.pdf; see generally Ariail, supra note 108 (discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of the end-user exemption on the 
effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act in regulating the derivatives market).  
183 156 CONG. REC. S6192–93 (daily ed. July 22, 2010) (letter from Sen. 
Christopher Dodd and Sen. Blanche Lincoln to House Chairmen Collin 
Peterson and Barney Frank on the Treatment of End Users) (“Congress 
recognized this concern and created a robust end user clearing exemption 
for those entities that are using the swaps market to hedge or mitigate 
856 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 33 
 
An exemption based on the HMCR standard is also present 
in the definition of major swap participants. Title VII creates new 
categories of market participants—specifically, major swap 
participants and swap dealers—based on the size of their derivative 
transactions.184 These classifications identify substantial players in 
the derivatives market and subject them to greater regulatory 
oversight and scrutiny.185 In so doing, the Act seeks to monitor the 
trading activities of potentially systemically important market 
participants so as to minimize risky or destabilizing behavior on their 
part.186 
The Dodd-Frank Act defines a major swap participant as any 
person who is not a swap dealer187 and maintains a substantial 
position in swaps, excluding positions held for hedging or mitigating 
commercial risk.188 So as not to dilute the potential reach of the 
                                                                                                                           
commercial risk. . . . These entities did not get us into this crisis and should 
not be punished for Wall Street's excesses. They help to finance jobs and 
provide lending for communities all across this nation. That is why 
Congress provided regulators the authority to exempt these institutions.”). 
184 See Further Definition of ‘Swap Dealer,’ ‘Security-Based Swap Dealer,’ 
‘Major Swap Participant,’ ‘Major Security-Based Swap Participant’ and 
‘Eligible Contract Participant,’ 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596 (May 23, 2012) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240); Final Rules Regarding Further Defining 
“Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract 
Participant,” CFTC, http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/ 
documents/file/msp_ecp_factsheet_final.pdf. 
185 See Dodd-Frank Act § 731.  
186 See Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 2179 (Jan. 13, 2012) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 45) (“In a broad sense, 
the costs presented to market participants by the requirements of this rule 
represent the internalization by financial market participants of a negative 
externality—the costs generated by systemically risky behavior on the part 
of market participants, which had previously been internalized by the 
taxpaying public in the form of government bailouts of failed financial 
firms that were brought down in part by this risky behavior.”). 
187 For a definition of swap dealer, see Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(49); 
Further Definition, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,596. 
188 Included in the definition of major swap participant is: (i) any person 
whose “outstanding swaps create substantial counterparty exposure that 
could have serious adverse side effects on the financial stability of the 
United States banking system or financial markets;” or (ii) any person who 
(1) “is a financial entity that is highly leveraged relative to the amount of 
capital it holds and that is not subject to capital requirements established by 
an appropriate Federal banking agency;” and (2) maintains a substantial 
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major swap participation classification, lawmakers severely limited 
the derivatives positions that could be excluded from these 
calculations.189 Consequently, the hedge exemption is quite 
significant to entities that use derivatives extensively, but would 
prefer to avoid the greater regulatory oversight that comes with being 
designated an MSP.  
The dearth of exemptions for these two pivotal provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act (i.e., the clearing mandate and the major swap 
participant definition) highlights their importance. Although the Act 
establishes the parameters of the rules, it does not define “hedge or 
mitigate commercial risk”; rather, this is left to numerous regulators, 
including the CFTC.190 The job of defining hedging was not a new 
one for the CFTC, having been tasked with this duty since its 
inception.191 What was new for the CFTC, however, was developing 
a workable definition of hedging that could be applied effectively to 
the large and varied types of derivatives, ranging from physical 
commodities to financial instruments, which now fell under its 
purview. 
To minimize uncertainty and provide a measure of clarity, 
the CFTC interpreted the HMCR standard consistently in adopting 
regulations regarding the end-user exemption and the MSP 
definition.192 Transactions that met any one of three tests would 
                                                                                                                           
position in outstanding swaps in any major swap category as determined by 
the [CFTC].” Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(33).  
189 The other exemption available to the major swap participant definition is 
also related to hedging. Specifically, positions held by “any employee 
benefits plan . . . for the primary purpose of hedging or mitigating any risk 
directly associated with the operation of the plan” are exempted from the 
definition of major swap participant. Dodd-Frank Act § 721(33)(A)(i)(II).  
190 The task of drafting regulations for Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act 
primarily fell to three groups of regulators: the CFTC, the SEC, and the 
“Prudential Regulators,” which includes the Federal Reserve Board, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency. Dodd-Frank Act § 712(a). The responsibilities of each 
regulator were according to the financial instruments or entities that were 
under the regulators’ domain. The derivatives of importance to this Article 
fell under the purview of the CFTC. As such, its regulations are the focus of 
this Article. 
191 See supra Part II.B. 
192 See End-User Exception to the Clearing Requirement for Swaps, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 42,560 (July 19, 2012) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 39); Further Definition 
of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap 
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant,” and “Eligible 
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qualify as a hedge under the HMCR standard.193 For the first test, the 
CFTC relied on prior regulations that included the bona fide hedge 
standard.194 To qualify as a hedge under the bona fide hedge 
standard, a transaction must (1) be “a substitute for transactions . . . 
or positions” that have been or will be undertaken “at a later time in 
a physical marketing channel”; (2) be “economically appropriate to 
the reduction of risks in the conduct and management of a 
commercial enterprise”; and (3) “arise from[] [t]he potential change 
of value of assets,” liabilities, or services.195 In addition, if a 
transaction meets these requirements and is the hedge of a hedge, it 
may also qualify as a bona fide hedge.196 
The second test under which a transaction may be classified 
as a hedge per the HMCR standard required that the derivative be 
“economically appropriate for the reduction of risks in the conduct 
and management of a commercial enterprise.”197 To provide some 
guidance to market participants, the regulations provide a non-
exhaustive list of six sources of risks that may be hedged within the 
scope of the rule.198  
                                                                                                                           
Contract Participant,” 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596 (May 23, 2012) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 1, 240). 
193 See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(kkk) (2013). 
194 See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z)(1). 
195 Id. 
196 7 U.S.C. § 6a(6)(2) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) (including in the bona fide 
hedge definition a swap of a swap that qualifies as a bona fide hedge). But 
see 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(kkk)(2) (refusing to recognize hedges of non-hedges as 
a qualifying transaction under the HMCR standard). 
197 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(kkk)(1)(i). 
198 Id. These include:  
(A) The potential change in value of assets that a person 
owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or 
merchandises, or reasonably anticipates doing so . . . in 
the ordinary course of business; 
(B) The potential change in the value of liabilities that a 
person has incurred or reasonably anticipates incurring in 
the ordinary course of business . . . ; or 
(C) The potential change in the value of services that a 
person provides, purchases, or reasonably anticipates 
providing or purchasing in the ordinary course of 
business . . . ; 
(D) The potential change in the value of assets, services, 
inputs, products, or commodities that a person owns, 
produces, manufactures, processes, merchandises, leases, 
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The third test recognized a transaction as a hedge if it 
qualified for hedge accounting treatment under Financial Accounting 
Standards Board accounting standards or Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board standards.199 Finally, the HMCR standard includes a 
catchall provision requiring that the transaction not be used for the 
“purpose that is in the nature of speculation, investing or trading.”200 
                                                                                                                           
or sells, or reasonably anticipates . . . [doing so] in the 
ordinary course of business . . . ; 
(E) The potential change in value related to any of the 
foregoing arising from . . . foreign exchange rate 
movements associated with such assets, liabilities, 
services, inputs, products, or commodities; or  
(F) Any fluctuation in interest, currency, or foreign 
exchange rate exposures arising from a person’s current or 
anticipated assets or liabilities . . . .  
199 Id. § 1.3(kkk)(1)(iii). In general, to be eligible for hedge accounting 
under the FASB, there needs to be “formal documentation of the hedging 
relationship and the entity’s risk management objective and strategy for 
undertaking the hedge.” ERNST & YOUNG, FINANCIAL REPORTING 
DEVELOPMENTS: DERIVATIVES AND HEDGING 8 (Oct. 2013). “Both at the 
inception of the hedge and on an ongoing basis, the hedging relationship is 
expected to be highly effective in achieving offsetting changes in fair value 
or cash flows during the period that the hedge is designated.” Id. The 
hedged item must present “an exposure to change in fair value or cash flows 
that could affect reported earnings,” and the hedged item cannot be related 
to  
(1) an asset or liability that is or will be remeasured with 
changes in fair value attributable to the hedged risk 
reported currently in earnings . . . , (2) an investment that 
is or will be accounted for by the equity method, (3) a 
present or future minority interest in one or more 
consolidated subsidiaries, (4) a present or future equity 
investment in a consolidated subsidiary, (5) a future 
business combination or (6) an equity instrument issued 
or to be issued by the entity and classified in 
stockholder’s equity.  
Id. Alternatively, to be generally eligible for hedge accounting under the 
GASB, a derivative is a hedging derivative instrument if the derivative is 
“(1) associated with an item that is eligible to be hedged and (2) determined 
to be effective . . . .” GOV’T ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., DERIVATIVE 
INSTRUMENTS: A PLAIN-LANGUAGE SUMMARY OF GASB STATEMENT NO. 
53, at 10 (2010). 
200 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(kkk)(2)(i). 
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2. The Volcker Rule 
 
One of the more significant limitations on how banks may 
use derivatives is section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, more popularly 
known as the Volcker Rule.201 Named after Paul Volcker, former 
chairman of the Federal Reserve who first proposed it,202 the Volcker 
Rule is one of the more controversial aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act 
because it attempts to resurrect the Glass-Steagall Act by separating 
investment banking from commercial banking.203 
The Volcker Rule prohibits a banking entity from engaging 
in proprietary trading and from acquiring, sponsoring, or having 
certain relationships with a hedge fund or private equity fund.204 In 
addition, nonbank financial companies that engage in such activities 
or have relationships with hedge funds or private equity funds are 
subject to additional capital requirements, quantitative limits or other 
restrictions.205 Affected entities have two years to comply with 
implementing regulations, and, during this time, they must conform 
their activities to the requirements of the Volcker Rule.206 
Importantly, the Volcker Rule exempts certain activities which, at 
times, may be indistinguishable from proprietary trading.  
For purposes of this Article, the most notable exemption is 
for hedging, which is undefined in the statute.207 The task of drafting 
                                                          
201 Dodd-Frank Act § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). 
202 Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate 
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 1025 (2011). 
203 Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial 
Markets, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 42 (2011). 
204 See Dodd-Frank Act § 619(a)(1).  
205 Id. § 619(a)(2). 
206 Id. § 619(c)(2). 
207 Id. § 619(d)(1)(C). Several agencies are responsible for enacting related 
regulations to implement the Volcker Rule, including the CFTC, the SEC, 
and the Prudential Regulators (collectively, “the Regulators”), and operate 
under the coordination of the Chairman of the Financial Stability Oversight 
Commission (“FSOC”). Id. § 619(b)(2)(A). Each agency is required to 
coordinate and consult with each other, so as to ensure consistency in 
implementation and application of the relevant rules. Id. § 619(b)(2)(B). 
Section 111 of the Dodd-Frank Act established the FSOC. Id. § 111. It is 
comprised of ten voting members and five non-voting members. Financial 
Stability Oversight Council: Who Is on the Council?, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, http://treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/council/Pages/default. 
aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). The voting members are: the Secretary of 
the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
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regulations to define the nuances and contours of the Volcker Rule 
was given to the CFTC, the SEC, and the Prudential Regulators.208 
These agencies adopted regulations that specify how they will 
determine whether a transaction qualifies as a hedge, thereby being 
eligible for exemption under the Volcker Rule.209 Given that credit 
derivatives fall under the purview of the CFTC, this Article will 
consider the final rules of the CFTC in this regard.210  
Per these regulations, banking entities are permitted to hedge 
individual and aggregate risks, thereby permitting portfolio 
hedging.211 The risk being hedged, however, must be a specific, 
identifiable risk that arises from the individual or aggregated 
                                                                                                                           
Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the Chairperson of the Securities 
Exchange Commission, the Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the 
Chairperson of the National Credit Union Administration, and an 
independent member with insurance expertise appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate for a six-year term. Id. The five non-voting 
members are: the Director of the Office of Financial Research, the Director 
of the Federal Insurance Office, a state insurance commissioner designated 
by the state insurance commissioners, a state banking supervisor designated 
by the state banking supervisors, and a state securities commissioner 
designated by the state securities commissioners. See Dodd-Frank Act 
§ 111(b); see also Financial Stability Oversight Council: Who Is on the 
Council?, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://treasury.gov/initiatives/ 
fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
208 See supra note 190, for a listing of the agencies that are referred to as the 
Prudential Regulators. 
209 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 
79 Fed. Reg. 5536 (Jan. 31, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248, 
351; 17 C.F.R. pt. 225) (SEC and Prudential Regulators’ final Volcker Rule 
regulations); Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds (“CFTC Final Volcker Rule”), 79 Fed. Reg. 5807 (Jan. 31, 
2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 75) (CFTC’s final Volcker Rule 
regulation). 
210 The CFTC Volcker Rule is not a joint rule with the Prudential 
Regulators and the SEC, but the agencies “worked closely together to 
develop the same rule text . . . except for information specific to the CFTC 
or the other agencies, as applicable.” CFTC Final Volcker Rule, 79 Fed. 
Reg. at 5808. 
211 Id. at 5907.  
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positions held by the banking entity.212 That is to say, banking 
entities are not permitted to hedge “more generalized risks that a 
trading desk or combination of desks, or the banking entity as a 
whole, believe exists based on non-position-specific modeling or 
other considerations.”213  
Further, to use the exemption, banking entities must adopt 
and enforce an internal compliance program that is “reasonably 
designed” to comply with the regulations.214 This compliance 
program must include written policies and procedures that address 
permissible techniques and strategies that the bank may use to hedge 
its exposure.215 Importantly, the bank’s internal compliance program 
must require that correlation analysis is undertaken to demonstrate 
that the hedge “significantly mitigates the specific, identifiable 
risk(s) being hedged . . . .”216 
To qualify for the exemption, the hedge activity must comply 
with the bank’s internal procedures and policies.217 At inception, the 
hedge must not introduce significant new or additional risks and 
must be designed to mitigate or demonstrably reduce one or more 
specific risks.218 Finally, the regulation requires that the 
compensation of persons implementing the bank’s hedging activity 
not be structured so as to incentivize impermissible proprietary 
trading.219 
 
3. The Swaps Push-Out Rule 
 
A final section of the Dodd-Frank Act that places restrictions 
on entities engaged in swaps transaction is known as the Swaps 
Push-Out Rule or the Lincoln Amendment.220 The Swaps Push-Out 
Rule disallows federal assistance to swap entities, which include 
swap dealers and major swap participants, but excludes major swap 
                                                          
212 Id.  
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 5784. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 5786. 
220 Dodd-Frank Act § 716, 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2012). It is called the Lincoln 
Amendment in recognition of its chief architect and proponent, former 
Senator Blanche Lincoln (D-AR). Wilmarth, supra note 201, at 1030. 
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participants that are insured depository institutions.221 In effect, swap 
entities are denied access to FDIC insurance and to the Federal 
Reserve discount window.222 The practical result is that swap entities 
that are required or need to have access to Federal assistance, such as 
banks, must either cease all derivative activities or siphon off these 
activities into an affiliate company.223 
 This broad prohibition has another important exemption. It 
does not prohibit access to federal assistance to a swap entity that 
limits its swap activities to “hedging and other similar risk mitigating 
activities directly related to the [swap entity’s] activities . . . .”224 
This hedge exemption, yet another example of the importance placed 
on hedge transactions, provides swap entities with a way of avoiding 
the impact of the Swaps Push-Out Rule if they are able to 
demonstrate that the transaction is a hedge. Section 716 became 
effective on July 16, 2013,225 but permits the relevant federal 
banking agency to grant a twenty-four month transition period for 
swap entities to divest or cease prohibited swap activity.226 The 
transition period may be extended for an additional year if the 
relevant Federal banking agency so decides.227  
 As stated above, the Swaps Push-Out Rule exempts hedging 
transactions from the Rule’s prohibition, but the scope of the 
exemption is unclear. No regulatory agency has to date proposed 
rules or issued guidance on how the hedge exemption will be 
                                                          
221 See Dodd-Frank Act § 716(b)(2). 
222 See id. § 716(a). 
223 Section 716(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act specifically allows a swap entity 
to form an affiliate entity and conduct all swap activities through this 
affiliate entity. See id. § 716(c). 
224 See id. § 716(d)(1). There are other available exemptions from the Swaps 
Push-Out Rule. See id. § 716(d). 
225 Id. § 716(h); see also Guidance on the Effective Date on Section 716, 77 
Fed. Reg. 27,456 (May 10, 2012). 
226 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(f). The OCC issued guidance that it would 
consider favorably a request by an insured depository institution for a 
transitional period of up to twenty-four months “to provide sufficient 
opportunity for institutions to conform their swaps activities in an orderly 
manner.” Transition Period Under Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 1306, 1307 (Jan. 
8, 2013). 
227 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(f).  
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interpreted and applied.228 The language used to identify hedge 
transactions under section 716 is similar in concept but is not the 
exact phrasing used for HMCR,229 bona fide hedging,230 or the 
Volcker Rule.231 Given that regulators have not indicated how this 
exemption will be applied, it is impossible to say whether or not the 
exemption will distinguish between beneficial hedge transactions and 
less-than-beneficial ones. However, the Swaps Push-Out Rule 
provides yet another example of the exemptions from key pieces of 
the derivatives regulatory framework that are granted to hedge 
transactions in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 The consistent exemption of hedge activity throughout the 
Dodd-Frank Act reflected the minimal concern lawmakers had for 
potential risks that could arise from hedges. As discussed below, 
risks can accompany credit derivatives used to hedge and these risks 
should be considered when deciding whether to exempt a transaction 
from regulatory oversight. 
 
III. Risky Hedging 
 
A. Risks of Hedging 
 
As beneficial as credit derivatives are for the dispersion of 
risk in the financial markets, there are also less beneficial aspects of 
their use, even when they are used to hedge. Prior literature has 
focused on the drawbacks of credit derivatives when they are used 
for non-hedging purposes and, consequently, resulted in losses.232 
                                                          
228 While the OCC and the Federal Reserve have issued rules relating to the 
scope of the Swaps Push Out Rule, i.e., which entities are entitled to the 
exemptions and subject to the prohibitions of section 716, the agencies have 
not issued any guidance indicating how “hedging and other similar risk 
mitigating activities” will be interpreted or applied. See Prohibition Against 
Federal Assistance to Swaps Entities (Regulation KK), 79 Fed. Reg. 340 
(Jan. 3, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 237).  
229 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(kkk) (2013). 
230 Id. § 1.3(z). 
231 Dodd-Frank Act § 619(d)(1)(C). 
232 See, e.g., Charles L. Hauch, Comment, Dodd-Frank’s Swap Clearing 
Requirements and Systemic Risk, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 278 (stating that 
CDSs have been “largely condemned for exacerbating losses”); Seema G. 
Sharma, Over-the-Counter Derivatives: A New Era of Financial 
Regulation, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 279, 280 (2011) (focusing on CDSs 
as a source of systemic risk that led to “the worst economic nightmare since 
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However, there are negative implications for firms and the financial 
markets when CDSs are used to hedge. Stated differently, when 
firms use credit derivatives to hedge, these derivatives may expose 
firms to hidden hazards that, instead of mitigating risks, expose firms 
to new, significant, and unmanageable risks. 
  In spite of the malleability of credit derivatives, a perfect 
hedge is almost impossible to achieve.233 A hedge, while mitigating 
one risk, oftentimes introduces another risk. For example, derivative 
hedge positions always expose a firm to counterparty credit risk.234 
Other reasons for a hedge being imperfect include a mismatch in 
duration, price, size, timing of payments, or terms of the hedge 
transaction.235 Some of these imperfections may be easily addressed, 
especially if the hedger is aware of the imperfections, but others may 
be more difficult to offset prior and subsequent to establishing a 
hedge. Further, hedging may expose firms to “codependent” risk—
that is, the risk of unknown interaction among risk exposure—or 
convergence risk.236 Each of these risks is discussed in greater detail 
below.  
 Counterparty credit risk. When credit derivatives are used to 
hedge, a firm may be exchanging credit risk for counterparty credit 
risk.237 Counterparty credit risk is the risk that the other party to the 
derivatives contract may become unwilling or unable to fulfill its 
                                                                                                                           
the Great Depression”). But see Houman B. Shadab, Guilty by Association? 
Regulating Credit Default Swaps, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 407, 415 
(2010) [hereinafter Guilty by Association] (highlighting the stability of the 
CDS market and the small impact of CDS losses resulting from the Lehman 
Brothers collapse). 
233 See DAN BORGE, THE BOOK OF RISK 77 (2001) (“As professional risk 
managers like to say ‘[t]he only perfect hedge is in a Japanese garden.’”). 
234 Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance 
Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 Emory L.J. 1153, 1163 (2012) 
(“Counterparty credit risk . . . is extremely difficult, if not impossible to 
hedge and is inherent in every derivatives transaction.”). 
235 CONLON, supra note 90, at A3.04 (describing reasons why a hedge may 
be imperfect).  
236 See infra notes 254–67 (discussing convergence risk) and notes 277–81 
(discussing codependent risk).  
237 EUR. CENT. BANK, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND COUNTERPARTY RISK 5 
(2009) (“The ‘risk circularity’ within the CDS market may be a concern for 
financial stability, as banks may be replacing one type of risk (i.e. credit 
risk) with another—counterparty risk.”).  
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side of the transaction.238 It is a natural corollary of hedging or, for 
that matter, any derivative transaction.239 With CDSs, counterparty 
risk is more worrisome because of jump-to-default risk or jump 
risk.240 Credit events for CDSs may occur suddenly, as reference 
entities jump to default, thereby requiring protection sellers to post 
collateral or compensate their counterparties within a short period.241 
Further, jump risk is most likely to occur when the markets are 
depressed and, consequently, protection sellers may be suffering 
from a liquidity crisis at that moment, as well, making it difficult for 
them to fulfill their obligations under the CDS contract.242 
                                                          
238 Feder, supra note 53, at 723 (describing the consequences of one party 
becoming insolvent before a contract is settled and how to mitigate 
“counterparty risk”); Guilty by Association, supra note 232, at 435 
(“Entering into a CDS transaction necessarily entails the transaction 
counterparties bearing certain risks. The most basic risk to a protection 
buyer is the counterparty risk of a protection seller not being able to meet its 
obligations upon the occurrence of a credit event.”). 
239 See Bank Finance, supra note 105, at 18–19 (“Because participants in 
the OTC market perform their own credit checks, participants often measure 
credit risk by determining the replacement cost of the swap transaction if 
the counterparty should default. Parties typically measure damages under 
the ISDA Master Agreement by determining the amount that a new 
counterparty would require to be paid (or an amount that it would pay) to 
assume the obligations of the defaulting party. Participants calculate this 
amount by discounting the present value of the net cash flows that the new 
counterparty expects it would receive or will pay over the remaining life of 
the derivative transaction. Depending upon the type of transaction and 
volatility of the risk hedged, this amount could exceed millions of 
dollars.”). 
240 Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic 
Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank 
Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. LEGIS. 49, 56 (2011) (“Counterparty nonperformance 
is more likely under jump-to-default scenarios because the obligee may not 
have sufficient liquidity to make notional amount payments immediately.”). 
241 Id. 
242 See, e.g., Charles Davi, How to Understand the OTC Derivatives 
Market, ATLANTIC (July 16, 2009, 1:00 PM), http:// 
business.theatlantic.com/2009/07/understanding_the_otc_derivatives_mark
et.php (“[C]ounterparty risk is highly correlated to macroeconomic credit 
risk . . . and so, as the overall risk of default rises, so does the risk of 
counterparty default. This means that CDS protection sellers are least likely 
to payout at the very moment they’re obligated to: upon someone else’s 
default.”). 
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 Market participants manage exposure to counterparty credit 
risk through margin and collateral requirements.243 Together, margin 
and collateral minimize a counterparty’s losses in the event of 
nonperformance.244 The amount required for margining and 
collateralization of a transaction reflects the parties’ “assessment 
both of the riskiness of the position and of each other’s credit 
quality.”245 Exchange-traded credit derivatives are subject to strict 
margining and collateral requirements to protect the clearinghouse 
and its members from the possibility of default.246 Further, because 
                                                          
243 See Things Fall Apart, supra note 66, at 206 (“At the time of the 
execution of the credit default swap agreement, parties typically do not 
exchange funds; rather, the parties agree to set aside a certain amount of 
collateral to cover their obligations under the agreement.”); Hal S. Scott, An 
Economy in Crisis: Law, Policy, and Morality During the Recession: 
Suggestions for Regulatory Reform: The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the 
United States Financial System, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 694 
(2010) (“Under current bilateral practice, a significant credit event that 
impairs the counterparty’s solvency or jeopardizes its ability to perform, or 
a significant change in a contract’s volatility, does not necessarily trigger 
readjustment of initial margin levels. But this lack of readjustment is a 
result of industry practice and perhaps better knowledge of counterparty 
individual risks for margin than is available through the homogenous 
margin practices of clearinghouses.”). 
244 Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
323, 351 (2011) [hereinafter Destructive Coordination] (“When the 
economy is strong, a borrower’s default risk is likely to be remote, 
minimizing the amount of capital each bank must set aside against 
prospective loss. When the economy sours, however, risk-based 
requirements can put pressure on each bank to strengthen its capital 
cushion . . . .”). 
245 Stephen G. Cecchetti, Jacob Gyntelberg & Marc Hollanders, Central 
Counterparties for Over-the-Counter Derivatives, BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2009, 
at 47, available at http://bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0909f.pdf. 
246 Things Fall Apart, supra note 66, at 236 (“The clearinghouse enters into 
an agreement with each of the parties and negotiates certain material terms 
of the agreement, such as margin and collateral requirements.”). Margin 
includes initial and variation margin. Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, 
Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case Study in Global Legal 
Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 647 (2010). Initial margin is the 
amount that must be deposited with the exchange at the time the contract is 
made. Id. at 648. At the end of trading, the contracts are marked to market, 
that is, the margin account is adjusted to reflect the party’s gains or losses. 
Id. at 647. If the balance in the margin account falls below a certain 
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the clearinghouse interposes itself between the parties to an 
exchange-traded credit derivative, the counterparty credit risk is 
limited to the clearinghouse.247 The inclusion of the clearinghouse as 
the counterparty for every exchange-traded derivative minimizes 
counterparty credit risk.248 
 Margin and collateral rules for OTC derivatives depend on 
the agreement reached between counterparties to the transaction. The 
use of collateral in OTC transactions has grown considerably, with 
an International Swaps and Derivatives Association survey reporting 
that 93% of credit derivatives were subject to collateral arrangements 
in 2011,249 compared to 63% in 2006.250 Collateralization and margin 
do not fully immunize parties to OTC transactions from counterparty 
credit risk, but can be beneficial in reducing their exposure.251 
                                                                                                                           
threshold, the party must deposit additional funds to return to the initial 
margin levels. Id. at 648. This is variation margin. Id. 
247 See Gerding, Credit Derivatives, supra note 106, at 42. 
248 Id. at 64. 
249 INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOC., MARGIN SURVEY 2012, at 3 
(2012), available at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/ 
surveys/margin-surveys. In 2012, this figure dropped to 73.7%. INT’L 
SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOC., MARGIN SURVEY 2013, at 2 (2013) 
[hereinafter MARGIN SURVEY 2013], available at 
http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NTcxMQ==/ISDA%20Margin%20Survey
%202013%20FINAL.pdf (“Among all firms responding to the survey, 
73.7% of all OTC derivatives trades (cleared and non-cleared) are subject to 
collateral agreements. For large firms, the figure is 80.7%.”).  
250
 INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOC., MARGIN SURVEY 2006, at 2 
(2006), available at http://www2.isda.org/attachment/MTY1NA==/ISDA-
Margin-Survey-2006.pdf (“Respondents report that approximately 59 
percent of their derivative transactions are secured by collateral agreements, 
and 63 percent of mark-to-market credit exposure is covered by collateral. 
These results continue trend of increasing coverage during the past several 
years: The 2003 Survey, for example, reported coverage of 30 percent of 
trades and 29 percent of exposure.”). 
251 See MARGIN SURVEY 2013, supra note 249, at 3 (“Nonetheless, 
collateralization remains among the most widely used methods of 
mitigating counterparty credit risk in the OTC derivatives market, and 
market participants have increased their reliance on collateralization over 
the years. In an evolving regulatory environment that broadly seeks to 
reduce the counterparty risk associated with derivatives, the continued use 
of bilateral collateralization has an important role to play in risk 
mitigation.”). The benefits of collateral and margin can be lessened by the 
type of collateral used and the way in which counterparties hold collateral 
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Importantly, the extent to which collateral and margin can reduce 
counterparty credit exposure depends on whether counterparties 
appropriately establish collateral and margin so as to reflect the level 
of risk faced.252 For OTC transactions, this information regarding the 
health of the counterparty may not be readily or accurately available. 
The inaccuracy of this information could result in the parties 
agreeing to inadequate margin and collateral levels.253 
 Convergence risk. Another risk that comes from hedging is 
convergence. Convergence risk may arise from hedging for two 
reasons—either convergence in hedging strategies or convergence of 
hedging counterparties.254 Converging hedging strategies refers to 
the possibility of all similarly situated firms undertaking the same or 
highly similar hedging strategy such that the occurrence of a single 
negative event affects these firms similarly.255 In such a scenario, the 
firm’s risks are multiplied because the actions of other parties 
diminish the effectiveness of its hedging strategy. The involvement 
of third parties that are beyond the control and influence of the 
hedger makes this risk particularly difficult for an individual firm to 
address ex ante. 
 Indeed, the risk of convergence in hedging strategies is more 
pronounced because of the likelihood that similarly situated firms 
will gravitate towards the same hedging strategy to protect their 
                                                                                                                           
and margin posted to them. For OTC trades, collateral can be posted in 
illiquid assets or other difficult-to-value assets, particularly in a stressed 
market. Further, collateral and margin may not be held in segregated 
accounts. See id. at 8–10 (“The low interest rate environment means that 
cash is, often, the cheapest-to-deliver form of collateral under most 
collateral agreements. . . . The first of these questions asked whether 
respondents had made arrangements to segregate collateral posted as 
Independent Amounts (“IA”) and what types of arrangements were made to 
secure that collateral.”).  
252 See Destructive Coordination, supra note 244, at 355 (“CDS costs 
surged following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
reflecting market-wide concern over the stability of other firms. The result 
was a significant increase in the amount of collateral that protection sellers 
were required to post.”); see also Nina Hval, Credit Risk Reduction in the 
International Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market: Collateralizing the Net 
Exposure with Support Agreements, 31 INT’L LAWYER 801, 809 (1997) (“In 
general, counterparties can alter the amount of assets that collateralize their 
derivative transactions as their credit exposure to each other rises or falls.”). 
253 See Gerding, Credit Derivatives, supra note 106, at 40.  
254 See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 17, at 203–04. 
255 See id. 
870 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 33 
 
operations.256 This was evident with the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 
2008.257 As the mortgage industry grew, mortgage providers 
established the same or highly similar hedging strategies to insure 
against the risk of default.258 This included using CDSs and CDOs to 
disperse the credit risk accompanying these loans.259 As the real 
estate market began to decline, numerous lenders were faced with the 
possibility that their hedging strategies would not provide them with 
the expected protection.260 Further exacerbating the problem was that 
their hedging strategies did not anticipate widespread default and the 
complete collapse of the housing market, along with the dependence 
of other mortgage providers on the same type of protection.261 Under 
the weight of this reality, their hedges buckled and, ultimately, 
failed. 
 Convergence of hedging counterparties is the other side of 
the same coin. This is the risk that firms will hedge with the same 
counterparty, thereby concentrating the risk in this entity, rather than 
diffusing risks broadly throughout the markets. The 2008 crisis, once 
again, provides a relevant example in American Insurance Group 
(“AIG”) and its subsidiary AIG Financial Products (“AIGFP”).262 In 
the years preceding the financial crisis, AIGFP was one of the 
leading sellers of protection on subprime mortgages through 
CDSs.263 Hedgers bought credit protection from AIGFP to the tune 
of billions of dollars and, notably, many did not require margin or 
collateral from AIGFP to protect against counterparty credit risk.264 
                                                          
256 See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 17, at 203–04; Houman B. 
Shadab, Coming Together After the Crisis: Global Convergence of Private 
Equity and Hedge Funds, 29 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 603, 607 (2009). 
257 See Dorit Samuel, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Will New Regulations 
Help Avoid Future Financial Debacles?, 2 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 217, 240–41 
(2009). 
258 See id. 
259 Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole 
with Legislative Sunlight, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. 127, 143–47 (2011). 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr. The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 943 (2009) (discussing AIG’s involvement in credit derivatives 
and the 2008 mortgage crisis). 
263 Sjostrom, supra note 262, at 959. 
264 Many counterparties did not require margin and collateral from AIGFP 
because of the triple-A credit rating enjoyed by AIG, the parent company. 
See supra notes 240–63 and accompanying text, for a discussion on 
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Because of AIGFP’s central role in the CDS market as a protection 
seller, there was a concentration of risk in the insurance behemoth. 
This convergence of risk caused panic within the markets when 
AIG’s pristine credit rating was downgraded and there were concerns 
with regards to whether AIGFP would be able to meet its obligations 
under the CDS to which it was a party.265  
 Convergence, whether in hedging strategies or hedging 
counterparties, in sum, is risk concentration. The risk of convergence 
when hedging with credit derivatives is further exacerbated by the 
fact that there are a limited number of possible counterparties for 
credit derivatives hedges, particularly portfolio hedges.266 By their 
nature, portfolio hedges will likely be customized transactions for 
which the counterparty will likely be a large financial institution. 
But, even non-portfolio hedges will likely be transacted with the 
same entities, thereby increasing the interconnectedness of the 
parties. This interconnectedness could result in a hedge being risky 
because the failure of one entity may have far-reaching consequences 
for numerous market participants and, potentially, the wider 
economy—in essence, systemic risk.267 
 Basis risk. Another significant risk of credit derivatives is 
basis risk. Basis risk is the risk that the credit derivative may not 
accurately track the risks the firms wants to neutralize.268 Although 
credit derivatives are highly malleable, the markets remain 
                                                                                                                           
counterparty credit risk and the importance of margin and collateral in 
providing protection buyers with safeguards. 
265 Sjostrom, supra note 262, at 962. 
266 A 2009 Fitch Ratings report stated that 80% of the derivatives positions 
held by the 100 companies reviewed were held by five banks—namely, JP 
Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and Morgan 
Stanley. FITCH RATINGS, DERIVATIVES: A CLOSER LOOK AT WHAT NEW 
DISCLOSURES IN THE U.S. REVEAL 1 (July 22, 2009), available at 
http://nysscpa.org/committees/banking/dder.pdf. 
267 See supra note 254 and accompanying text, for a discussion of systemic 
risk. But see Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 17, at 221–22 (“These 
hedging strategies, at least theoretically, facilitate risk-spreading to parties 
better able to bear the risks. . . . This diversification of risk also reduces the 
likelihood that a default will cause any given institution to fail and mitigates 
the impact of any such failure on other institutions . . . .”). 
268 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 86, at 123; ANDREW M. CHISHOLM, 
DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED 240 (2d ed. 2010) (“[T]he risk that results from 
potential changes in the relationship or ‘basis’ between two financial 
variables.”). 
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imperfect.269 Consequently, a firm may not be able to use a credit 
derivative that matches on a one-to-one basis the level, quantum, or 
type of risk the firm faces. These imperfections result in firms 
establishing a less-than-ideal hedge position, albeit one that is the 
best available in the market. A firm may hedge with a credit 
derivative that has a high, yet tolerable, basis risk for a number of 
reasons—a lack of derivatives contracts that perfectly match its 
needs; the derivative being used is more liquid than the one that most 
closely matches its needs; or, a preference to hedge using a different 
underlying asset for diversification of exposure.270 Nonetheless, if 
basis risk is improperly or insufficiently managed, the hedge position 
may expose the firm to risks that outweigh the benefits of the 
hedge.271 
 As an example, imagine a firm that has credit risk exposure 
to a few sovereigns in Asia. CDSs linked to these sovereigns’ debt 
are not liquid.272 The firm decides to manage its exposure through a 
CDS linked to an Asian sovereign index that is more liquid. Because 
the firm is not hedging its exposure to the sovereign in question, the 
transaction exposes the firm to the possibility that the CDS may not 
precisely match the losses the firm will experience in the event of the 
sovereign’s default. If the sovereigns to which the firm is exposed 
default, but this default is not matched by the CDS index on which it 
has bought protection, then the firm is unprotected in its exposure to 
the Asian sovereigns in spite of its hedging activities. 
 Basis risk is not new to users of credit derivatives, but with 
portfolio hedging,273 basis risk becomes a significant concern. As 
discussed previously, with a portfolio hedge, a firm is attempting to 
mitigate varied risks as efficiently as possible.274 This endeavor is 
inherently complicated and involves some mismatch between the 
risks the firm faces and the credit derivative used to address these 
risks.275 As such, the firm faces the possibility that the hedge position 
                                                          
269 Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 17, at 232.  
270 See Hull, supra note 71, at 51–54. 
271 See id. at 53 (“Note that basis risk can lead to an improvement or a 
worsening of a hedger’s position. Consider a short hedge. If the basis 
strengthens (i.e. increases) unexpectedly, the hedger’s position improves; 
[and vice versa]. For a long hedge, the reverse holds.”). 
272 Cf. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 66, at 57 (discussing the 
illiquidity of European sovereign debt). 
273 See supra Part I.B, for a discussion on portfolio hedging. 
274 See supra Part I, for a discussion on portfolio risk. 
275 See supra Part I.B, for a discussion on hedging in practice. 
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will not operate as expected. Put another way, in using a credit 
derivative to hedge portfolio risks, the position may not mitigate the 
risks to which the firm is exposed to the extent or in the manner 
intended. Rather, the hedge strategy may expose the firm to 
significant, unforeseen risks that compromise the effectiveness of the 
hedge and the stability of the firm undertaking the hedge.  
Although modeling should control for basis risk, modeling may 
fail because of (a) a lack of historical inputs that adequately capture 
the range of possible outcomes, or (b) the inability of the model to 
capture the scenario facing the firm ex ante.276 Market imperfections, 
therefore, can result in a failed hedge that does not mitigate risks as 
expected, but instead increases the risk exposure of the firm. 
 Codependent risk. Relatedly, using credit derivatives to 
hedge may expose the firm to “codependent risk.” This is the risk 
that a hedge exacerbates a separate, unrelated risk to which the firm 
is exposed, but which is positively correlated to the hedge position or 
risks the hedge is aimed at mitigating.277 Importantly, codependent 
risk, as defined herein, is not correlational risk. “Correlation risk 
refers to the change in the [payoff or] marked to market value of an 
asset when the correlation between the underlying assets changes 
over time.”278 On the other hand, codependent risk refers to 
seemingly unrelated risks that are positively correlated, but the 
correlation is unknown to the firm at the time of the hedge. 
Codependent risk, therefore, exacerbates risks associated with a 
hedge such that if the hedge fails, the losses are magnified 
exponentially because of the codependency of the underlying risk 
being hedged (or the hedge instrument used) and another risk 
exposure of the firm. 
                                                          
276 Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 22, at 141 (“Monte 
Carlo simulations . . . estimate[] financial losses using sophisticated random 
sampling driven by advanced computing power. This random sampling 
proves particularly valuable when several different variables can interact to 
produce financial loss . . . . Modelers can assume that this relationship will 
follow historical patterns (use historical data), which leads back to the 
problem of whether the historical data selected provide an adequate 
sample.”). 
277 The term “codependent risk” is coined in this Article specifically for 
purposes of describing the risk that may flow from use of credit derivatives 
in the manner described herein. 
278 Knowledge Center Archive, SEI INVS. CO., available at http://seic.com/ 
enUS/about/3133.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
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Thus, codependent risk, in a non-financial manner, may be 
analogous to mixing two medications that worsen the side effects of 
each. This risk is all the more possible in portfolio hedging, as the 
firm may not be aware of, or have accounted for, the different ways 
in which risks outside of the portfolio being hedged may correlate 
with the hedge positions being taken for a specific portfolio. Being 
unaware of the codependent risks, the firm does not appropriately 
calculate these risks into the costs of its hedging strategy. 
Consequently, when the hedge begins to go awry and worsens the 
codependent risks, the firm may not be able to manage or contain the 
fallout.  
 Consider the following example: a firm is exposed to credit 
risk from a range of countries and customers. To protect itself, the 
firm enters into a highly complex, customized, and illiquid CDS with 
a derivatives dealer.279 The firm has never used this CDS to manage 
its risks, but believes that it should mitigate its credit risk exposure. 
When the risks that the firm sought to manage arise, however, the 
hedge does not operate as intended. Instead, the transaction heightens 
the risk exposure of the firm because, in addition to not eliminating 
the risk in the way the firm intended, the transaction has exposed it 
to new hidden risks.  
 When hedging a portfolio of risks with a complex financial 
instrument, it is difficult to predict how the instrument will behave or 
how it will impact other sectors of a firm’s business.280 Further, when 
the instrument being used is illiquid, as in the scenario presented 
above, it is even more difficult for the firm to unwind the transaction 
                                                          
279 Derivatives dealers are intermediaries that will take the other side of a 
derivatives contract, with the hope that they will earn a profit when they 
find another party to take the opposite side of the transaction. In other 
words, dealers are middlemen that connect counterparties that have opposite 
needs. Because of this, dealers are essential to the liquidity of the 
derivatives market. See Chisholm, supra note 268, at 3; Thomas C. Singher, 
Note, Regulating Derivatives: Does Transnational Regulatory Cooperation 
Offer a Viable Alternative to Congressional Action?, 18 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1397, 1405 (1995) (“Thus, dealers provide valuable liquidity to 
derivatives markets and eliminate the need for end-users to locate one 
another independently.”).  
280 See Kian-Guan Lim, Portfolio Hedging and Basis Risk, 6 APPLIED FIN. 
ECON. 543, 543 (1996) (“[I]f the spot-futures prices are not cointegrated, 
the hedged portfolio suffers from the risk of potentially large changes in 
value . . . .”). 
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or reduce the harmful impact of the poorly performing transaction.281 
Being able to accurately estimate the likelihood of codependent risk 
is difficult because it is a prime example of the “unknown 
unknowns”282—that is, the inadvertent creation of new, significant 
risks resulting from the use of intricate credit derivatives to manage 
complex financial risks. Consequently, when portfolio hedging is 
undertaken using complex credit derivatives, it is necessary to 
consider the possibility of codependency risk, especially because of 
the difficulty in accurately predicting the behavior of these 
instruments in the face of market stress or unexpected financial 
events. Codependent risk may also raise systemic concerns. If a 
firm’s hedging strategy exposes it to codependent risk, this risk could 
weaken the position of the firm in the markets—subjecting it to 
margin calls and other stressors that could affect its liquidity. If the 
firm at issue is systemically important, the repercussions of this 
exposure could spread to the wider economy, impacting entities and 
markets that are unconnected to the firm’s derivatives use. 
The risks that can arise from hedging demonstrate that 
hedging can actually expose firms to risks, even if they are useful for 
risk management. As such, if the goal of the Dodd-Frank Act is 
management or reduction of systemic risk, it is arguably unwise for 
hedges to be routinely exempted from regulatory oversight, as is 
currently the case. Historically, when derivative-like instruments 
were simpler and the focus of regulation was the prevention of fraud 
and market manipulation, a sweeping hedge exemption made more 
sense. However, with the current focus of market regulation being on 
the reduction of systemic risk, to provide a blanket exemption for all 
hedges regardless of the instruments or strategies being used to 
hedge does not further the purported legislative goal of monitoring 
                                                          
281 See JP MORGAN, THE J.P. MORGAN GUIDE TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES 18 
(1999), available at http://investinginbonds.com/assets/files/ 
Intro_to_Credit_Derivatives.pdf (“A Dynamic Credit Swap avoids the need 
to allocate resources to a regular mark-to-market settlement or collateral 
agreements. Furthermore, it provides an alternative to unwinding a risky 
position, which might be difficult for relationship reasons or due to 
underlying market illiquidity.”). 
282 Frank Partnoy, What’s Inside America’s Banks?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 2, 
2013, 5:38 PM), http://theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/01/whats-
inside-americas-banks/309196/?single_page=true. 
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and regulating such sources of risk;283 nor does this course of action 
improve the health of the financial markets.  
 It is important, therefore, that modern recognition of 
transactions as a hedge balance the benefits against the costs in order 
to determine whether a transaction should be categorized as a hedge. 
By incorporating a cost-benefit approach to the definition of 
hedging, what constitutes a hedge is appropriately constrained such 
that beneficial transactions that mitigate risks are granted preferential 
regulatory treatment. On the other hand, transactions that introduce 
new, significant risks that outweigh the benefits of the transaction are 
subject to greater regulatory scrutiny. However, this cost-benefit 
balance, while necessary, is difficult to achieve. Many of the risks 
associated with credit derivative hedges are not accounted for in the 
markets because of informational asymmetry and negative 
externalities.284 Put another way, market participants in undertaking 
these transactions, and the market in pricing them, may not 
accurately account for the risks that accompany these transactions 
either because they are unaware of the risks or because they know 
they will not bear the costs in full and are, thus, unconcerned with 
them. Both of these theories are discussed below.  
 
B. Do Credit Derivative Hedges Need to Be 
Regulated? 
 
The focus of the Dodd-Frank Act was on the reduction of 
risks in the derivatives markets, in an effort to avoid a repeat of the 
2008 financial crisis.285 With respect to hedge transactions, the 
specific concerns of lawmakers were two-fold: (1) prevent 
speculative activities from being disguised as hedges; and (2) 
allowing end-users286 to manage their risks using derivatives.287 This 
                                                          
283 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative 
goals of market stability and transparency). 
284 See infra Part III.B. 
285 Things Fall Apart, supra note 66, at 205-15 (analyzing the role that 
systemic risk resulting from credit derivatives played in the 2008 financial 
crisis). 
286 See supra Part II.C.1, for a discussion on end-users and the end-user 
exemption.  
287 See RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE COMMODITIES 
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT ISSUES 5 
(June 2013) (“[I]f a grain farmer uses a futures position to hedge against the 
possibility that grain prices might eventually fall, then . . . he may be 
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focus was understandable. Credit derivatives were thought to be 
responsible for the implosion of AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman 
Brothers because these firms used these instruments to engage in 
highly speculative, yet profitable, activities that endangered the 
health of the broader economy.288 Hedging, on the other hand, was 
seen as beneficial, not as a potential source of risk in the derivatives 
market.289 So the view of lawmakers boiled down to a simple maxim: 
hedging was good and, therefore, should be freed from the 
restrictions of regulation. 
 But to maintain such a simplistic view of hedging is to be 
unaware of the complexities of hedging strategies and instruments 
that are available to firms. Indeed, given the risks that may arise 
from credit derivatives hedging strategies, as discussed above,290 it is 
evident that not all hedges are equally beneficial. Instead, it is 
necessary to balance the risks of the hedge against its benefits to 
ascertain whether the transaction truly mitigates risk. Admittedly, 
this balance is difficult. It is not always feasible to accurately gauge 
whether the benefits of a hedge outweigh the costs. However, rather 
than engage in a nuanced approach to hedges, the Dodd-Frank Act 
assumes that hedging is more beneficial than not and, consequently, 
exempts such transactions.291 In an era in which hedging instruments 
and strategies are more complex, it is vital for the stability of the 
                                                                                                                           
required to post additional cash or liquid securities to cover unrealized 
losses in that position. . . . Many nonfinancial firms complained during the 
debate over the Dodd-Frank Act that their use of derivatives posed no 
systemic threat and thus they should not be subjected to the cost of clearing 
these OTC derivatives. . . . This particular debate came to be known as ‘the 
end-user debate’. . . . As a result of these concerns, the Dodd-Frank Act in 
[s]ection 723 includes a broad exemption from the clearing requirement for 
firms that are primarily non-financial in nature.”). 
288 Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 196–203 (2009) (blaming the failure of AIG, Bear 
Stearns, and Lehman Brothers on CDSs). 
289 Ludger Hentschel & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Controlling Risks in 
Derivatives Markets 1 J. FIN. ENG’G 101, 101–02 (1995) (“In brief, we 
argue that the possibility of widespread default throughout the financial 
system caused by derivatives has been exaggerated, principally due to the 
failure to appreciate the low default risk associated with individual 
derivative contracts.”). 
290 See supra Part III.A, for a discussion of the risks associated with 
hedging with credit derivatives. 
291 See supra Part II.C.1, for a discussion on the Dodd-Frank Act bona fide 
hedging exemption.  
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market and market participants to reconsider what transactions are 
treated as hedges—a process that should prevent treating risky 
hedges the same as less-risky hedges.  
 Therefore, it is important that regulation exempts only those 
transactions in which, on balance, the benefits outweigh the risks and 
which do not introduce new, significant risks to the firm’s 
operations. Lawmakers have failed to consider the potential 
downside of hedges and, consequently, do not apply a balancing 
standard in defining and regulating hedges. Rather, the definition of 
a hedge is vague and all hedges, regardless of the type of transaction 
or potential associated risks, are exempted from oversight.292  
 Arguably, such broad-based exemptions for all hedges, 
including credit derivative hedges, may be a valid regulatory 
approach if firms and markets incorporate a cost-benefit definition of 
hedging when pricing the transaction or deciding which instruments 
to use to hedge. If parties were able to accurately account for the 
risks that accompany hedging with credit derivatives, then the 
approach of lawmakers, to exempt all hedges, would be the best 
approach. However, the opposite is also true—that is, if the markets 
do not accurately assess the benefits and incorporate the attendant 
costs of using credit derivatives to hedge, then regulation will be 
necessary to minimize the impact of the firms’ and markets’ 
misjudgments.293 
 Therefore, the issue is whether hedgers and their 
counterparties are able to and actually will correctly determine, 
without the assistance of legal rules, the best way to hedge using 
credit derivatives. The optimal way to hedge with credit derivatives 
is the approach that exposes hedgers to the least risks and imposes 
the least costs, not only on the parties to the hedge, but also on the 
wider financial markets. Under a Coaseian understanding, legal rules 
are unnecessary for credit derivatives hedges because the parties will 
bargain for the optimal result.294 This view, however, is premised on 
                                                          
292 See supra Part II.C, for a discussion of this lack of regulation. 
293 See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 17, at 232.  
294 Seth D. Harris, Coase’s Paradox and the Inefficiency of Permanent 
Strike Replacements, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1185, 1269 (2002) (“Coase and the 
NLRA's sponsors shared an interest in efficiency and a belief that 
bargaining can be a means to achieve it.”); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew 
Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73, 
75–76 (1982) (“This assumption is, in essence, a statement that parties in 
non-zero-sum games will choose a Pareto optimal allocation.”); Michael I. 
Swygert & Katherine E. Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: The 
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certain assumptions,295 two of which are relevant here: (1) perfect 
information of the parties involved in the hedge and (2) no 
externalities from the risks of hedging that affect non-parties to the 
hedge transaction. Neither assumption holds true, however, with 
regard to hedge transactions undertaken with credit derivatives. 
 Regulation of credit derivatives hedges is not needed if 
parties have the information necessary to balance efficiently the risks 
of the credit derivatives hedge against its benefits, because the 
parties will factor in the potential risks in pricing the transaction. 
However, there are reasons to believe that there is asymmetrical 
information in using credit derivatives to hedge, resulting in 
inefficient recognition and pricing of risks.  
Informational asymmetry “[a]rises whenever a buyer or 
seller has more information about a product or service than his 
counterpart does—which can provide the better-informed party with 
considerable economic advantage.”296 As an initial matter, it is 
                                                                                                                           
Integration of Fairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249, 277 (1998) 
(“[T]he Coase Theorem implies that the assignment of rights would not be 
important in terms of economic efficiency, because, regardless of which 
party received an entitlement, the parties would bargain to achieve the 
Pareto optimal allocation of resources.”). But see Stewart Schwab, 
Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 
256 n.47 (1987) (“I emphasize that the Coase Theorem predicts only that 
the parties will bargain to an efficient outcome.”). 
295 The Coase Theorem is based on different assumptions, including: 
rational actors, no transaction costs, no legal impediments to bargaining, 
competitive markets, perfect competition, and perfection information. See, 
e.g., Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 294, at 73 (explaining the Coase 
Theorem as stating that: “a change in a liability rule will leave the agents’ 
production and consumption decisions both unchanged and economically 
efficient within the following (implicit) framework: (a) two agents to each 
externality (and bar-gain), (b) perfect knowledge of one another's (convex) 
production and profit or utility functions, (c) competitive markets, (d) zero 
transactions costs; (e) costless court system, (f) profit-maximizing 
producers and expected utility-maximizing consumers, (g) no wealth 
effects, [and] (h) agents will strike mutually advantageous bargains in the 
absence of transactions costs”); see generally Steven G. Medema & Richard 
O. Zerbe, Jr., The Coase Theorem, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
836–92 (Boudewijn, Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (discussing 
various criticisms against and arguments in favor of the Coase Theorem). 
296 Fink, supra note 113, at 1. 
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inherently difficult to price credit derivatives.297 Credit risk is priced 
using historical data and advanced financial modeling, but there are 
two notable limitations. First, credit risk may be mispriced if one 
does not look back far enough in time to create a more accurate 
picture.298 Second, the approach is based on certain assumptions that 
do not hold during times of market stress or disruption.299 Further, 
valuing CDSs and CDOs entails pricing the credit risk of the 
underlying assets. As noted by Professor Gerding: 
 
Pricing credit risk as it flows through a long chain of 
multiple securitizations and credit derivatives 
requires parties to either trace information back to 
the ultimate underlying assets (an enormously 
                                                          
297 JOHN D. FINNERTY, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS’ CREDIT DERIVATIVES 
PRIMER 41 (2000) (explaining that credit derivatives are more difficult to 
price than other types of derivatives because of the inherent differences 
between credit derivatives and other derivatives); Peter Eavis, Unreliable 
Guesswork in Valuing Murky Trades, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013, 4:33 
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/14/how-hard-is-it-to-value-
derivatives-see-the-details-of-the-jpmorgan-case/?_r=0 (“The lawyers 
defending the two JPMorgan traders may use the fuzziness of the 
derivatives market to their advantage. They might ask: How can the 
government argue that the traders’ valuations were off when there it’s [sic] 
difficult to know what the ‘right’ price is?”). 
298 Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 22, at 141 (“To 
calculate value-at-risk, modelers must assume the basic distribution of 
losses, i.e., they must determine the shape of the curve in the preceding 
diagram. They have three options. First, they can assume that losses fall in a 
“normal” distribution—in other words, that they follow a bell-curve shape. 
This assumption may have no basis in reality. Therefore, modelers can take 
a second approach of using historical data to determine the distribution of 
losses. This approach has downsides as well; historical data chosen may 
suffer from sample bias. For example, modelers may not have looked far 
enough back in time to gather data, and may miss important historical 
events in which massive losses were incurred. Inputting more historical data 
would ameliorate this, but financial markets do not always follow historical 
patterns.”). 
299 The Black-Scholes model is one approach to valuing credit risk and is 
based on the assumption that market prices change in continuous time. See 
ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 68 (2000). This assumption falters during 
market disruptions, as was seen in the failure of Long-Term Capital 
Management upon the default of Russia on its debt. Id. at 144–60. 
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difficult task) or to rely on the risk calculations of 
investors or rating agencies earlier in the chain (who 
may have perverse incentives or have made 
mistakes).300 
 
The difficulty in pricing credit derivatives strongly suggests 
that parties may also have difficulty in recognizing and ascertaining 
the risk of hedging with CDSs and CDOs.301 Because of 
informational asymmetry, parties are not able to accurately price the 
costs and benefits of using credit derivatives to hedge.302 Oftentimes, 
the credit protection buyer has more information on the risks 
accompanying the underlying debt than the credit protection seller, 
thereby making it more challenging for the protection seller to 
accurately price the credit derivative.303 This is true particularly for 
complex credit derivative hedges, or one that references an illiquid 
underlier. Further, with each transfer of the credit risk,304 the 
information regarding the underlying credit risk deteriorates, making 
                                                          
300 Gerding, Credit Derivatives, supra note 106, at 55. 
301 Chorafas, supra note 18, at 9–10 (“The problem is that the fine print of 
the risks embedded in credit derivatives is not visible to outsiders—even if 
the nature of these risks is known to them in order of magnitude, which is 
not necessarily the case. It is always difficult to assess an institution’s credit 
risk if it is being based only on disclosures showing up in annual reports 
and similar statements. But it becomes nearly impossible to do so with 
pools of assets and liabilities if one is not an insider.”). 
302 FRANK SKINNER, PRICING AND HEDGING INTEREST AND CREDIT RISK 
SENSITIVE INSTRUMENTS 292 (2005). 
303 Id. (“To make matters worse, the seller of credit protection also faces an 
information asymmetry. That is, the buyer of credit protections, being the 
lender of the reference bond, would know more about the likelihood of 
restructuring than the seller of the credit protection.”). 
304 Credit risk can change hands many times creating a complex, 
interconnected web of buyers and sellers of credit protection. For example, 
a bank that has exposure to Company A may purchase credit protection 
from Hedge Fund B in the form of a CDS. Hedge Fund B may hedge its 
exposure to the debt it bought by entering into a CDS with Insurance 
Company C and so on. The further along in the chain the counterparty finds 
itself, the less information it has about the underlying credit risk. See 
generally Robert P. Bartlett III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A 
Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 IOWA 
J. CORP. L. 1 (2010) (describing the chain of risk transfers that can occur in 
the life of a credit derivative). 
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it even more difficult to price subsequent transfers.305 Such 
transactions carry costs and risks that are not being accounted for in 
the pricing of the transaction. Consequently, the unaccounted for 
risks in these transactions require that officials play an important role 
in regulating these hedges. 
 The second assumption, that there are no negative 
externalities from hedging with credit derivatives on third parties, is 
equally problematic. Given that today’s markets present an 
interconnected arena in which contagion is easily spread among 
firms, a failed credit derivative hedge will impact the wider 
markets.306 The fallout from this hedge is not likely to remain 
confined to a single firm; rather, the fallout will likely affect the 
broader markets. Consequently, the costs of such a credit derivative 
hedge are not going to be borne solely by those who are party to the 
transaction; rather, the broader markets will share in the costs of the 
transactions.  
 The externalities are even greater if one of the firms in the 
failed hedge is systemically significant or is exposed to convergence 
risk. As such, the parties are not incentivized to internalize the costs 
that come with the transactions.307 Put another way, the parties to the 
transaction can internalize the benefits of the CDS and CDO hedge 
and externalize the costs. Regulation is needed, therefore, to force 
the parties to internalize the costs of the CDS hedge and to minimize 
the externalities on the broader markets. 
 In sum, the risks that accompany credit derivative hedges 
require that the derivatives regulatory scheme include credit 
derivatives instead of exempting them wholesale. Some regulatory 
oversight is necessary to mitigate the risks that accompany CDS 
hedges because firms and the markets are unable to efficiently and 
accurately assess the costs and benefits attendant to the use of these 
instruments.  
 
                                                          
305 Gerding, Credit Derivatives, supra note 106, at 40 (“This difficulty 
[calculating the risk of default] stems in part from the tendency of 
information on underlying credit risk to deteriorate with each credit risk 
transfer.”). 
306 Id. (“Through this chain reaction of falling dominoes, counterparty risk 
can transform into systemic risk.”). 
307 See, e.g., Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 32, at 1040–42. 
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IV. Implications and Recommendations 
 
A. Failure of Dodd-Frank to Address the Hazards of 
CDS Hedging 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act presumes hedges are beneficial and 
exempts these transactions from much of the derivatives regulatory 
framework. However, the Act does not define what constitutes a 
hedge. This task is left to various regulators charged with 
implementing the legislation.308 As argued above, hedging should be 
defined in terms of the costs and benefits of the transaction in 
managing risk and concomitant risk exposure from the transaction.309 
The primary risks surrounding the use of credit derivatives to hedge 
are counterparty credit risk, convergence risk, basis risk, and 
codependent risk.310 Generally, the new regulatory framework does 
not recognize or address these risks, but, to the extent that it does, it 
falls short in how it handles these risks. 
Generally, the hedge exemptions contained in the Act and 
related regulations fail to delineate between hedging with credit 
derivatives and other types of hedge transactions. Because of the 
risks that may accompany credit derivatives, they should be 
regulated, not exempted from oversight, even when supposedly used 
to offset risks. In adopting a blanket exemption for hedges without 
concern for the instrument used, lawmakers have ignored the 
complexities of CDSs and CDOs. Policymakers also overlooked the 
additional risks that accompany these instruments, even if a firm 
intends to use them in a supposedly benevolent manner. The 
difficulty in valuing credit derivatives, in addition to the 
informational asymmetry and negative externalities surrounding 
these instruments, means that the risks identified, while not unique to 
credit derivatives, are acutely present even when these instruments 
are used to hedge.311 As such, credit derivatives should not be 
exempted in the same manner or to the same extent as other 
derivative instruments, even when used to hedge.  
An overarching concern with the exemption of hedge 
transactions is that lawmakers have maintained a traditional, 
                                                          
308 See supra Part II.C and accompanying notes. 
309 See discussion supra Part III.  
310 For a discussion of these risks, see supra Part III.A. 
311 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
884 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 33 
 
microprudential approach to these types of transactions.312 Rather 
than considering the impact that widespread credit derivative 
hedging could have on the markets, the definition of hedging takes a 
firm-specific approach that does not take into consideration whether 
a hedge transaction exposes the firm or the markets to risks.313 This 
is particularly relevant with respect to convergence risk, which 
requires a macro-approach to the hedging strategies of market 
participants, especially those that are systemically important. 
Viewing the hedging strategies of market participants in a vacuum, 
without consideration of the hedging activities of other similarly 
situated firms, provides only a partial picture of the impact hedging 
decisions may have on the markets or other actors. 
Importantly, the Act introduces recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements for swaps, including credit derivatives that have been 
implemented pursuant to CFTC rulemaking.314 Under these rules, 
parties to a swap are required to report specified information to the 
appropriate swap data repository or, if none exists, directly to the 
CFTC.315 Admittedly, the reporting and recordkeeping regime that 
                                                          
312 Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Ӧncü, A Proposal for the Resolution of 
Systemically Important Assets and Liabilities: The Case of the Repo Market 
2 (Oct. 4, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
federalreserve.gov/Events/conferences/2012/cbc/confpaper6/confpaper6.pdf 
(“Taking the micro-prudential view, both the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Regulation and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) signed into law by 
President Obama in July 2010 in the U.S. and, internationally, Basel III 
focus on single financial institutions.”).  
313 Id. 
314 See Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 45 (2013) (detailing swap recordkeeping requirements and how to report 
under the section); Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements: 
Pre-Enactment and Transition Swaps, 17 C.F.R. § 46 (2013).  
315 The CFTC adopted final rules to implement these reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements. See 17 C.F.R. § 45; 17 C.F.R. § 46. Under the 
recordkeeping requirements, both counterparties must keep records about 
the swap. 17 C.F.R. § 46.2; 17 C.F.R. § 45.2. The reporting final rule 
requires that counterparties report the terms of their swap transaction to 
Swap Data Repositories (“SDR”). 17 C.F.R. § 46.3; 17 C.F.R. § 45.10. For 
every swap, one of the counterparties is also responsible for reporting 
information about the swap to the appropriate SDR. 17 C.F.R. § 46.5; 17 
CFR § 45.8. This information includes: price, notional size, and life cycle 
events. 17 C.F.R. § 46.3 (discussing multi-asset swaps); 17 C.F.R. § 45.3–4 
(discussing life cycle events). The SDR will then publicly disseminate the 
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the Act establishes316 will reduce the magnitude of imperfect 
information within the markets, thereby lessening the opacity of the 
markets and better enabling market participants to price more 
accurately the instruments used to hedge.317Nonetheless, 
informational shortcomings are likely to persist, especially with 
regards to portfolio hedges.318 Counterparties will continue to face 
difficulties in valuing CDOs319 and estimating counterparty credit 
risk, even under the CFTC’s reporting and recordkeeping regime. 
The information the CFTC requires parties to report to the markets, 
namely price and notional size, may ameliorate counterparty credit 
risk and convergence risk to some extent, as market participants will 
have more information on the trading activities of other market 
participants. Yet, this publicly available information will not 
eliminate the informational asymmetry issues discussed above 
because parties need more data to better assess the risks arising from 
the underlying assets.  
In relation to the clearing mandate and the swap dealer 
definition, regulators have restricted recognition of a transaction as a 
hedge to those in which a firm is managing pre-existing risk 
exposure.320 However, circumscribing the definition of a hedge in 
this manner is unhelpful, as this categorization does not always 
match whether a transaction, on balance, is more beneficial than 
risky. It is possible that a credit derivative transaction in which a firm 
is managing secondary risk is, on balance, more beneficial than one 
in which a firm is mitigating primary risk. To treat these two 
transactions disparately because of the source of the risk, but without 
concern for the risks that may accompany either transaction, is to 
miss the proverbial forest for the trees. Put another way, limiting the 
definition of hedging to the mitigation of pre-existing risk may 
address some forms of risky hedging, but if there is no consideration 
                                                                                                                           
information in real time. Real-Time Public Reporting, 17 C.F.R. § 43 
(2013). 
316 17 C.F.R. § 45; Dodd-Frank Legislation: “Reporting and Record-
keeping,” BAKER TILLY (Aug. 2, 2012), http://bakertilly.com/dodd-frank-
legislation-reporting-and-recordkeeping. 
317 Dodd-Frank Act, CFTC, http://cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ 
index.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
318 See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes, for a discussion on portfolio 
hedging.  
319 See Bartlett, supra note 304, at 3–4. 
320 See Exceptions to the Clearing Requirement, 17 C.F.R. § 50.50(c) 
(2013); supra Part I. 
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of risk exposure from a credit derivative hedge, then lawmakers may 
be ignoring some of the more significant sources and types of risks. 
In crafting the regulations for the clearing mandate and the 
swap dealer definition, regulators used the historical bona fide hedge 
definition.321 Yet, the adoption of the bona fide hedge standard to 
apply to all types of derivatives is problematic. While the bona fide 
hedge standard may be appropriate for determining if a transaction 
based on a physical commodity is a hedge, it is questionable whether 
the standard may be imported to address hedging with credit 
derivatives. Going beyond the complexities of credit derivatives that 
differentiate them structurally from commodities futures, the bona 
fide hedge exemption may not be able to serve the current goals of 
financial market regulation. The bona fide hedge exemption was 
developed initially to eliminate fraud and curb market 
manipulation,322 but now regulatory goals are aimed at reducing 
systemic risk and achieving market stability. Implementation of a 
hedge standard that does not take into account whether the alleged 
hedge introduces new, significant, and unmanageable risks to the 
firm does not further these goals. In fact, it may undermine the Act’s 
goals to not place these considerations at the forefront when 
considering whether a transaction should be designated as a hedge. 
Notably, the clearing mandate and swap dealer definition 
embrace a definition of hedging that also fails to account for whether 
the transaction introduces new, significant risks to the entity. 
Because of this shortcoming, transactions that may expose a firm to 
basis and codependent risk could, nonetheless, be exempted from 
regulatory oversight. The failure to consider whether a transaction is, 
on balance, creating more risks than it is mitigating, may have 
significant consequences for firms that are able to avoid regulatory 
oversight of credit derivative hedges. Similarly, in failing to question 
whether the transaction introduces additional risk, the firm may be 
exposed to basis risk that results in the risks of the supposed hedge 
outweighing its expected benefits. This is further compounded by the 
                                                          
321 See Q&A—Final Rulemaking Regarding Further Defining “Swap 
Dealer,” “Major Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” 
CFTC 2, http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/ 
msp_ecp_qa_final.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (“The interim final rule 
draws upon principles in the Commission’s long standing interpretation of 
bona fide hedging. It excludes swap activity for the purpose of portfolio 
hedging and anticipatory hedging.”). 
322 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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absence of any mechanism within these regulations that induce firms 
to consider the impact that such risky hedges may have internally on 
the stability of their own operations or externally vis-à-vis the 
broader economy. As such, not only are firms able to avoid 
internalization of potential costs of these risky hedge transactions, 
but the regulations do not require these entities to consider whether 
the transaction, on balance, increases risks.  
Furthermore, there are additional issues specific to the hedge 
exemption contained in the clearing mandate. To reduce counterparty 
credit risk inherent in OTC credit derivative transactions, the Act 
mandates that all standardized derivatives are cleared and gives the 
CFTC authority to determine what types of derivatives must be 
cleared.323 However, clearing may not be the “panacea” that 
lawmakers expect it to be.324 As a baseline matter, it is important to 
note that clearing derivatives will not “eliminate” counterparty credit 
risk; rather, it will “concentrate[] the credit risk” in the 
clearinghouse.325 Although it is true that clearinghouses are able to 
manage counterparty credit risk better than individual firms,326 the 
point is that clearinghouses shift risk, not eliminate risk.327 As such, 
counterparty credit risk is decreased, but not removed from the 
markets. 
                                                          
323 For a discussion of the Dodd-Frank clearing requirements, see supra Part 
II.C.1. 
324 See Craig Pirrong, The Inefficiency of Clearing Mandates, 665 POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 1, 2 (July 21, 2010).  
325 Wallace Turbeville, Derivatives Clearinghouses in the Era of Financial 
Reform, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REFORM: WILL IT WORK? HOW 
WILL WE KNOW? 45, 46 (Michael Konczal ed., Roosevelt Institute 2010). 
326 Id. (“Clearinghouses manage credit risk using proven methods and 
systems that are uniform and virtually always superior to what can be 
achieved by individual trading firms.”). The question of whether the 
clearing mandate is the most effective way to handle the risks associated 
with the OTC derivatives market is beyond the scope of this Article. See 
generally Pirrong, supra note 324 
327 See Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating 
Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 185, 193 (2013) (“Consequently, some 
commentators conclude that introducing clearinghouses may only shift risks 
in the OTC derivatives market from the balance sheets of individual market 
participants to the balance sheet of a centralized institution.”); Adam J. 
Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 
GEO. L.J. 445, 465 (2013) (“In particular, clearinghouses are secured 
creditors, which transfer risk to members’ unsecured creditors by limiting 
the assets available to them in the event of a member's bankruptcy.”).  
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 Another important issue regarding the clearing mandate is 
the natural limitations to its implementation. Namely, a 
clearinghouse can only be effective in reducing risks if it deals in 
products that are both fungible and liquid.328 Bespoke, complex 
credit derivatives used to hedge likely will not be eligible for 
clearing—thereby, voiding the benefits of central clearing for these 
types of transactions. Arguably, the more complicated the hedge, the 
more risks involved—these credit derivative hedges, potentially, are 
even riskier but are outside the scope of the clearing mandate. 
Consequently, counterparty credit risk will remain a significant 
source of risk for uncleared credit derivatives used to hedge. The 
failure of a major counterparty may still have destabilizing 
consequences on a firm using CDSs and CDOs to hedge. This 
analysis holds true for non-financial end-users who take advantage of 
the clearing exemption in hedging with credit derivatives. 
Admittedly, it is not likely that the instability of a non-financial end-
user from exposure to a failed credit derivative-based hedge would 
have systemic consequences. However, convergence of hedge 
counterparties or hedging strategies could cause the failure of many 
similarly situated end-users, which, in turn, may have systemic 
implications.  
While the Volcker Rule regulations consider whether the 
hedge introduces significant risks into the system, unlike the 
regulations for the clearing mandate and the swap dealer definition, 
their reach is stymied.329 For one, the Volcker Rule regulations apply 
to banks, bank affiliates, and certain nonbank entities, and not to 
market participants generally.330 This limitation may not be all that 
insignificant, as these are likely the actors whose hedging activities 
using credit derivatives may pose the greatest risk to the 
marketplace. Consequently, the built-in limitation of the Volcker 
Rule hedging standards to these entities is likely appropriate. 
Nonetheless, even with regard to hedging activities by end-users and 
other market participants, regulators should consider conditioning 
recognition of credit derivative-based transactions as hedges only if 
these transactions do not introduce new, significant risks to the firm 
itself or the wider market. This would require a more streamlined 
definition of hedging that currently does not exist in the disparate 
regulatory frameworks. 
                                                          
328 Turbeville, supra note 325, at 46–47. 
329 See supra Part II.  
330 See Dodd-Frank Act § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). 
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Another salient issue is with temporal reach of the Volcker 
Rule regulations. That is to say, the regulations only consider 
whether the hedge introduces new and significant risks at 
inception.331 They do not consider or address subsequent 
development of significant risks, such as codependent risk. 
Therefore, these large systemically important institutions may still be 
able to undertake a potentially hazardous hedge using CDSs and 
CDOs, even under the Volcker Rule regulations. In presuming 
hedges to be beneficial, the Dodd-Frank Act exempts hedges from 
regulatory oversight. In so doing, the Act fails to recognize the 
potential risks that arise from use of these instruments for seemingly 
beneficial reasons. Notable steps were taken to address counterparty 
credit risk and convergence risk, specifically through the clearing 
mandate and the recordkeeping and reporting requirements. 
However, these measures fall short in truly protecting the financial 
markets from the risks of credit derivatives hedges, particularly 
codependent risk. 
 
B. Recommendations  
 
Using credit derivatives to hedge can be beneficial, but, as 
this Article argues, these types of transactions may be hazardous to 
the hedger and, possibly, to the broader economy. The Dodd-Frank 
Act presumes that all hedges are beneficial and that they do not need 
to be subject to regulatory oversight. However, as discussed above, 
CDS- and CDO-based hedges should be subject to regulatory 
oversight in order to minimize the impact of a risky hedge on the 
markets and market participants. But, addressing the risks attendant 
to hedge transactions with credit derivatives is not an easy task, 
primarily because the hazards are not always readily identifiable. As 
discussed above, informational asymmetry and negative externalities 
contribute to the inability of firms and the markets to accurately 
balance the costs and benefits of a credit derivative hedge. 
 As an initial matter, the risks of a credit derivatives hedge 
that results from informational asymmetry and negative externalities 
are best addressed through ex ante regulation because ex post 
regulation would be inefficient and reactionary in regards to failed or 
                                                          
331 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 
79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5632 (Jan. 31, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 
248, 351; 17 C.F.R. pt. 225). 
890 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 33 
 
failing credit derivative hedges.332 Indeed, by the time the firm 
recognizes the new, significant, and, possibly, unmanageable risks 
arising from a credit derivative it used to hedge, it is too late to 
compartmentalize the impact of the failed hedge from destabilizing 
the firm and its counterparties. As one academic sagely noted: 
“Secrets . . . do not last long and derivatives failures travel . . . .”333 It 
is important, therefore, to attempt to limit the spread of hedge failure, 
which as discussed above, can affect numerous large, systemically 
important institutions owing to interconnectedness and convergence 
in the markets for credit derivatives. 
 There are three primary mechanisms by which regulators can 
address inefficient cost-balancing arising from informational 
asymmetry and/or negative externalities—increased disclosure, 
decreasing the risky activity, and/or a corrective tax.334 Each is 
discussed below. Ultimately, no one suggestion may be sufficient on 
its own, but some combination may be required to achieve the most 
efficient regulatory approach. 
 
1. Enhanced Disclosure 
 
A time-honored response to the problem of informational 
asymmetry is increased disclosure.335 The securities markets are 
regulated under a disclosure regime in which persons seeking to 
participate in the markets are required to disclose material 
information regarding products they are selling.336 With respect to 
credit derivatives, greater disclosure of related costs and risks of the 
                                                          
332 Regulation is required ex ante to protect from losses, which is the intent 
of the law. Ex post regulation would not be able to protect from losses, but 
could only react once losses have already occurred. Therefore, ex post 
regulation is insufficient because it does not effectuate the intent of the law.  
333 CHORAFAS, supra note 18, at 39. 
334 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
92–94 (2004) (discussing the option of a corrective tax to control negative 
externalities). 
335 Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate 
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure 
Literature, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 405, 408 (2001) (“Another potential 
solution to the information asymmetry problem is regulation that requires 
managers to fully disclose their private information.”). 
336 See generally The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, 
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, 
http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
2013-2014 HAZARDOUS HEDGING 891 
 
products should mitigate informational asymmetry, allowing the 
parties to make more informed decisions regarding the value of the 
transaction.337 To be most effective, the disclosure regime must be 
mandatory.338 This ensures a specified, minimum level of disclosure 
from all parties and prevents parties from either failing to disclose 
unfavorable information or only doing so selectively. 
 Although greater disclosure will reduce informational gaps, 
it is not enough to address the issues identified with credit derivative 
hedges. First, in spite of disclosure, the parties may nonetheless 
operate with incomplete information. Further, the level of disclosure 
necessary for the parties to have perfect information may be 
prohibitively costly. As such, parties will only disclose information 
up to the point at which it is cost efficient for them to do so. 
Incomplete information may persist because the parties simply do 
not know the risks attendant to the credit derivative-based hedge. If 
the parties themselves are ignorant to the risks of their credit 
derivative hedges, they will not be able to disclose the risks. 
Secondly, if disclosures become pro-forma, parties may discount the 
disclosures made or fail to appreciate the severity of the risks 
involved.339 Consequently, the information disclosed may not be 
considered or factored in when the parties evaluate a credit 
derivative hedge and its potential risks. 
 In spite of the persistence of informational asymmetry, 
lawmakers should require enhanced disclosure of CDS and CDO 
hedges because, while imperfect, it will still be an important tool for 
regulators in monitoring these transactions. Further, lawmakers 
should commission a study of how financial institutions use credit 
derivatives to hedge in order to better understand the risks that can 
arise from use of these instruments. Credit derivatives can be 
complicated financial instruments. The unintended consequences of 
using credit derivatives to hedge are not yet fully understood or 
                                                          
337 Jaime Caruana, Gen. Manager, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Keynote 
Address at the FSB Roundtable on Risk Disclosure: Financial Stability and 
Risk Disclosure (Dec. 9, 2011), available at http://bis.org/speeches/ 
sp111222.pdf (“Nevertheless, strengthened, transparent disclosure is good 
for markets, because it helps investors make more informed decisions.”). 
338 For a general discussion on the benefits of mandatory disclosure 
regulation, see Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in 
Securities Regulation Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 
81, 81–85 (2007). 
339 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World 
of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 19. 
892 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 33 
 
appreciated by lawmakers and market participants alike. 
Nonetheless, they are being treated in the same manner as derivative 
instruments with which there is much more historical familiarity. 
Lawmakers and regulators, therefore, should subject these 
instruments to greater study to develop a more fulsome 
understanding of their workings and the possible codependent risks, 
among other risks, that can develop from the extensive use by 
numerous market participants in different ways. 
 
2. Limitations on Credit Derivative Hedges 
 
To reduce the risks of credit derivative hedges, regulation 
could also seek to decrease the level of activity associated with these 
types of transactions. One way to accomplish this would be to limit 
recognition of certain CDS and CDO transactions as hedges. As a 
starting point, regulators could classify as a hedge only cleared or 
exchange-traded credit derivatives. This would deny preferential 
regulatory treatment for OTC credit derivative hedges, encouraging 
firms to move as many of their hedges to clearinghouses or central 
exchanges. This classification would comport with the goals of the 
Dodd-Frank Act of moving as much derivatives trading as possible 
to exchanges. Another approach would be to deny hedge recognition 
to illiquid credit derivatives and/or credit derivatives used for 
portfolio hedges. This approach creates a narrower category of 
transactions that would not qualify for the hedge exemption, 
focusing on those that are on balance most likely to be more risky 
than beneficial.  
Either proposal would enhance regulatory oversight of the 
types of hedging transactions that are most likely to be accompanied 
by hidden risks. Such limitations would not prevent firms from 
hedging—either with illiquid credit derivatives or with credit 
derivatives for portfolio hedging. Firms can choose to use a more 
liquid credit derivatives or hedge risks on a micro, rather than macro, 
level in order to have the transaction classified as a hedge. 
Alternately, they could use these transactions to hedge, but these 
transactions would not be deemed a hedge for regulatory purposes. 
This alternative places the need for market stability above the firms’ 
individual needs to use certain instruments or strategies to address 
their risk exposure.  
 Yet another alternative to restrict credit derivative hedge 
activity is to impose position limits on credit derivative hedges. 
Position limits have been considered solely in terms of their ability to 
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minimize market manipulation by speculators.340 However, position 
limits may also have a useful role in limiting the reach of a failed 
credit derivative hedge transaction. Through position limits, 
regulators can address the risks that arise from using credit 
derivatives to hedge.341 By employing position limits in this manner, 
the fallout of a failed hedge would be cabined significantly, as it 
would reduce the exposure of hedgers and other market participants 
to certain hedge transactions. 
 Notably, hedge position limits would limit the exposure of a 
firm to codependent risk, particularly with portfolio hedges, by 
limiting the size of an outstanding position in credit derivatives used 
to hedge. Further, if limitations were imposed on these instruments 
used to hedge, in the event that a firm falls victim to codependent 
risk, the resulting negative consequences would be minimized. This 
limitation is similar to the Dodd Frank Act’s requirement that banks 
maintain a portion of mortgages they have originated on their 
books.342 Moreover, imposing limitations on credit derivative-based 
hedges would minimize the negative consequences in the event a 
firm falls victim to codependent risk. Similarly, position limits would 
also limit the consequences of a hedge that exposes a firm to 
counterparty credit risk and convergence risk. 
 Given that hedging is beneficial, position limits should not 
apply across the board to all hedge transactions. Instead, position 
limits for hedgers should be higher than position limits for 
speculators. This would respect the fact that the reasons for imposing 
hedge position limits are not the same as the reasons for imposing 
speculative position limits. Also, this would recognize that hedging 
can be beneficial and should be encouraged. Finally, hedge position 
limits should not apply to one-to-one credit derivative hedges and 
CDS or CDO hedges traded on an exchange or cleared. These types 
are less likely to have systemic implications or raise the concerns 
pertaining to credit derivative hedging discussed throughout this 
Article.  
 However, position limits, even for speculative positions, face 
strong market objections and may be politically impossible for 
                                                          
340 See supra Part II.B. 
341 See supra Part II.B.  
342 Dodd-Frank Act § 641(b)(b), (c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2012). 
894 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 33 
 
agencies to impose.343 Such objections would likely be even stronger 
for subjecting hedges to position limits. One of the main objections 
is that hedge position limits would have a chilling effect on hedging. 
Hedge position limits, the argument goes, would discourage firms 
from entering into beneficial hedges because of higher transactional 
costs or, worse yet, may encourage regulatory arbitrage, as firms 
would search for less regulated means to neutralize their risk 
exposure. However, regulating hedging is not the same as preventing 
hedging. This Article proposes the former, not the latter. Further, 
because of the importance of hedging to corporate risk management 
strategies, it is unlikely companies will abandon hedging because of 
restrictions. Indeed, firms may be more conscientious in exposing 
themselves to credit risk knowing that their ability to offset these 
risks will be legally limited. 
 The fact that regulation chills activity, whether intentionally 
or unintentionally, while a legitimate objection, is an argument that 
may be leveled against the adoption or imposition of most rules. As 
some academics have opined, the financial markets are similar to the 
tragedy of the commons,344 in that each actor seeks to reap maximum 
benefits from finite resources, without regard for the resources’ 
depletion. In order to prevent or reduce the likelihood of complete 
exhaustion of these finite resources, laws need to regulate each 
actor’s use of the resources in order to maximize the common good. 
Imposing hedge position limits to circumscribe the possible fallout of 
a bad hedge is one of the best ways to ensure that market participants 
are able to share in the finite resources of the “financial markets 
commons.” 
 
3. Margin and Collateral Requirements  
 
 A well-recognized way of forcing firms to internalize the 
negative externalities that accompany their activity is through use of 
a corrective tax.345 The implementation of a corrective tax forces 
                                                          
343 See generally Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. CFTC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 
259 (D.D.C. 2012) (overturning speculative position limits established by 
the CFTC). 
344 Things Fall Apart, supra note 66, at 190; see generally Schwarcz, 
Systemic Risk, supra note 17. 
345 Economist Arthur Pigou first explored and explained the use of taxes in 
controlling externalities. According to Pigou, the presence of negative 
externalities from the actions of others justified government intervention in 
2013-2014 HAZARDOUS HEDGING 895 
 
parties to moderate their activities because of the increased costs 
associated with the activities. Under a corrective tax regime, parties 
will make payments approximating the anticipated harm of their 
activities.346 A corrective tax is useful, even when the state or 
affected parties do not have perfect information regarding the 
magnitude of the harm.347 
 In the context of hedging with credit derivatives, a corrective 
tax would impose higher margin and collateral requirements for 
credit derivative-based hedges. Margin and collateral requirements 
provide two main benefits to firms. Margin and collateral protect 
parties from counterparty credit risk.348 The amount required is based 
on the likelihood of counterparty default and the risks accompanying 
the underlying. Accurate information regarding both risks is, 
therefore, necessary for parties to determine the appropriate level of 
margin and collateral that ought to be required. Margin and collateral 
requirements also impose a cost on firms who have to pay it. Assets 
that are committed to collateralizing credit derivatives are not 
available for business operations and cannot be utilized by the 
firm.349 The costs imposed, therefore, will force parties to limit their 
activities accordingly. 
However, the benefits of margin and collateral can be muted 
by leverage. Leverage is a key feature of credit derivatives and can 
be present even in hedge transactions—albeit in less obvious 
ways.350 In the context of credit derivatives, a transaction is 
leveraged when a counterparty does not commit capital to cover the 
                                                                                                                           
order to control or discourage the activity from which the negative 
externality arose. Such taxes are referred to as Pigouvian taxes. On the other 
hand, Pigou also advocated a subsidy for those whose activity generated a 
positive externality. These are called Pigouvian subsidies. See generally 
ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932); Shavell, 
supra note 334, at 94.  
346 See Shavell, supra note 334, at 94 n.23. 
347 See id. at 95. 
348 See supra Part III.A.  
349 INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, MARKET REVIEW OF OTC 
DERIVATIVE BILATERAL COLLATERALIZATION PRACTICES 5 (2010) 
(“[Collateralization] has become a risk-reduction method of choice for 
banks and non-bank financial institutions for many reasons; . . . it reduces 
capital requirements which frees up capital for other investment 
purposes . . . .”). 
350 Gerding, Credit Derivatives, supra note 106, at 41. 
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full amount of its future obligation under the contract.351 
Additionally, lower than required margin and collateral requirements 
can result in highly leveraged credit derivative contracts.352 With 
respect to CDSs, for example, if collateral and margin is set too low, 
the CDS protection seller will apportion less capital to cover its 
future obligations.353 Additionally, the protection seller will be able 
to enter into more CDSs, using the excess cash as collateral and 
margin for other CDSs.354 Leverage is important in assessing the 
risks of hedging with credit derivatives, as the fallout from 
counterparty default is magnified significantly if counterparties to 
credit derivatives are leveraged.355 
The Dodd-Frank Act authorizes regulators to establish 
collateral requirements for derivatives that are exempted from 
exchange trading and central clearing.356 In implementing these 
rules, it is particularly important that regulators consider that parties 
using credit derivatives to hedge their risk exposure may not 
accurately account for the risks of using these instruments. Rather 
than subjecting credit derivatives-based hedges to the same or lower 
collateral requirements or, alternately, leaving this decision primarily 
to the parties using these instruments, regulators should impose a 
minimum level of required collateral and margin, which increases 
depending on the characteristics of the credit derivative instrument 
being used or the underlying asset. This requirement will go a long 
way in forcing parties to internalize the costs of using these 
instruments, in spite of imperfect information. 
 
                                                          
351 Id. 
352 Id. at 42. 
353 See id. (“Lower collateral means that a party to a derivative contract 
need deploy less of its own capital to cover its future payment 
obligations.”). 
354 Id. (“When set too low, collateral requirements allow a firm to increase 
leverage excessively or to overinvest in underwriting fresh derivative 
contracts.”). 
355 Id. at 41 (“The financial damage from counterparty defaults can increase 
exponentially to the extent that the parties to a derivative contract are 
leveraged.”). 
356 Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see also Gerding, 
Credit Derivatives, supra note 106, at 30. 
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Conclusion 
 
Hedging is a necessary and significant tool for firms to 
manage risks that arise from their daily operations.357 With the 
advent and development of credit derivatives, firms are able to shift 
risk to parties who are able to bear the risk more efficiently.358 
However, the use of credit derivatives to neutralize risk exposure is, 
itself, fraught with risks. Firms that choose to offset risks with these 
complex instruments may be exposed to different risks, including 
counterparty risk, convergence risk, basis risk, or codependent 
risk.359 To decide whether a transaction is a true hedge, therefore, the 
inquiry should not focus on the intent of the parties or on the source 
of the risk; rather, a true hedge should be determined by looking at 
whether the benefits of the transaction outweigh the costs. 
While balancing the costs against the expected benefits of 
the transaction seems straightforward, firms and the markets are 
limited in their ability to accurately gauge the costs of using credit 
derivatives to hedge. Asymmetrical information and negative 
externalities affect the ability of firms to account for the costs of 
hedging with credit derivatives.360 Regulation is needed to force 
parties to account for costs that they would otherwise fail to 
incorporate when deciding how to value the costs of credit 
derivatives used to manage risk exposure. 
Lawmakers, however, have focused on the benefits of 
hedging, treating attempts by firms to hedge as equally beneficial 
irrespective of the instruments utilized to achieve the task.361 While 
the benefits of using CDSs and CDOs to neutralize risk are 
undeniable, there are risks that must be considered. To treat all 
derivative transactions the same based on their intended purpose—
here, to hedge risk exposure—is to ignore a potentially significant 
source of risks to the financial markets. Given that credit derivatives 
used to hedge may expose firms to new, significant risks that 
outweigh the benefits of the transaction, wholesale exemptions from 
regulatory oversight are inappropriate for these instruments. 
Regulators, therefore, should impose some measure of regulation on 
                                                          
357 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
358 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
359 For a discussion of these risks, see supra Part III.A. 
360 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
361 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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these complex instruments in order to minimize the potential damage 
to the financial markets that could result from their unbridled use. 
